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INTRODUCTION
In the wake of President Trump’s announcement that he will
withdraw the United States from the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate
change, then-California Governor Jerry Brown called on the President
to fight climate change or to “get out of the way” while the rest of the
world works to reduce emissions and invest in clean energy. 2 Similarly,
former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg—now a United
Nations (U.N.) Special Envoy for Cities and Climate Change—said, “If
Washington won’t lead, then mayors and governors will.” 3 Indeed,
Trump’s threat to withdraw has not only been met with widespread
criticism and derision abroad and at home, but as this Article examines,
has also sparked more consequential action, with numerous U.S. mayors
and governors pledging to meet emissions-reductions goals outlined in
the agreement. 4
A similar dynamic is playing out in the context of immigration. In
the aftermath of Trump’s promise to “end” sanctuary jurisdictions by
cutting them off from federal funding, 5 a growing number of state and
local governments are refusing to participate in the enforcement of
federal immigration law by disentangling their criminal justice systems
from the federal immigration regime. This disentanglement process
began well before the Trump presidency, but it has accelerated by some
measures since the 2016 election. 6 Rather than using an era of mass
incarceration to facilitate a new era of mass deportation, these
jurisdictions have adopted a set of reforms to protect immigrants from
deportation when they interact with the criminal justice system. 7
2 The Latest: Jerry Brown to Trump: “Get Out of the Way”, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 12,
2017), https://www.apnews.com/1098c54326f14a61b149e4e2030a40f4 [https://perma.cc/ZA6GHG25] [hereinafter Brown to Trump].
3 Jonathan Watts, Alternative US Group Honouring Paris Climate Accord Demands ‘Seat at
the Table’, GUARDIAN (Nov. 11, 2017, 10:55 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/
2017/nov/11/alternative-us-group-honouring-paris-climate-accord-demands-seat-at-the-tablebonn [https://perma.cc/3L8M-3F3W].
4 See discussion infra Section II.B.1.
5 Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
6 For a discussion of trends in disentanglement policies since the 2016 election, see infra
Part III.
7 See generally Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities”, 59 B.C. L.
REV. 1703 (2018) (making this point in the sanctuary cities context).
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Climate change and sanctuary jurisdictions are but two areas that
reflect the conflict between state and local progressivism and federal
conservativism. Yet climate and immigration policy are somewhat
unique in that they represent case studies of federalism conflicts that are
inherently transnational. 8 While federalism is a staple of legal
scholarship, this Article brings a new lens to this old debate:
international law theory. Drawing on international law and its close
cousin, international relations theory, 9 I examine how—now, more than
ever—federalism matters that are inherently transnational can be better
understood by applying analysis at the border of constitutional and
international law. 10 As an advantage of taking a trans-substantive
8 Of course, state, county, and local governments have been policy innovators on a range
of other issues that are beyond the scope of this Article, including marriage equality, health
care, gun control, marijuana legalization, and living wage protections. I am limiting the focus to
climate change and sanctuary jurisdictions, as both are inherently transnational and relate to
the broader themes of this Article concerning sovereignty and international law.
It is also worth noting that innovation by subnational governments promotes not only
progressive goals, but conservative aims as well, such as prohibitions on sanctuary jurisdictions
(as with SB4 in Texas), restrictions on marriage equality (before the Supreme Court protected
marriage equality), limitations on transgender rights (as in North Carolina), and religious
exemptions to sexual identity and/or gender identity antidiscrimination protections. For an
important discussion of state anti-sanctuary policies, see Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Rick Su &
Rose Cuison Villazor, Anti-Sanctuary & Immigration Localism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 837 (2019).
9 This Article enlists both international law and its cousin from political science,
international relations theory, as the two are quite interconnected in international law
scholarship and practice. As Anne-Marie Slaughter famously notes, “Just as constitutional
lawyers study political theory, and political theorists inquire into the nature and substance of
constitutions, so too should two disciplines that study the laws of state behavior seek to learn
from one another.” Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, International Law and International
Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 205 (1993) (noting that “the postulates [of
international relations theory] . . . concerning patterns . . . in state behavior must afford a
foundation and framework for legal efforts to regulate that behavior.”).
10 This Article builds on an earlier generation of federalism scholarship (prior to 2000) by
international law scholars (including my own earlier work) but applies a new angle. For a
summary and discussion of this earlier transnational federalism scholarship, see, for example,
Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism: Constitutional Possibilities for Incorporation of Human
Rights Law in the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245 (2001); Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations
Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223 (1999); and Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with
Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627 (1997).
Other more recent federalism controversies (following 2000) have international
dimensions as well, including the debates over marijuana legalization (given international drug
cooperation and agreements); guns (given the flap over the U.N. Arms Trade Treaty, which
critics claimed would lead to additional registration requirements for small arms); and the
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approach in considering federalism, climate change and sanctuary
policy provide a helpful contrast with one another, because while
international law in the climate area is gaining traction, international
protections on immigrants’ rights are weak to nonexistent.
At the same time, the climate and sanctuary case studies represent
similarities in that both can be understood within the context of the
constitutional law scholarship on backlash, even though the response
here is to White House policies, not court decisions. 11 But rather than
view backlash as destructive, constitutional law scholars might view it as
constitutive of normative progress—as critically important for
sharpening, defining, and deepening traction for law reform. 12
treatment of foreign nationals on death row in states where the death sentence is available (in
light of international protections under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(VCCR)). See, e.g., Wells C. Bennett & John Walsh, Marijuana Legalization Is an Opportunity
to Modernize International Drug Treaties, BROOKINGS (Oct. 15, 2014), https://
www.brookings.edu/research/marijuana-legalization-is-an-opportunity-to-modernizeinternational-drug-treaties [https://perma.cc/ZWX7-XPNA]; see also Mike Weisser, What Does
the New UN Small Arms Treaty Really Say?, HUFFPOST (Nov. 25, 2013, 11:04 AM), https://
www.huffingtonpost.com/mike-weisser/un-small-arms-treaty_b_4337810.html
[https://
perma.cc/BCW8-ZTET]; Paul Schiff Berman, Federalism and International Law Through the
Lens of Legal Pluralism, 73 MO. L. REV. 1149 (2008) (discussing the interaction of federalism
and international law in the context of the VCCR). Interestingly, in contrast to state and local
initiatives to mitigate climate change or protect immigrants, the trend in state and local
initiatives that have sought to legalize marijuana are not in sync with international drug
treaties. See Bennett & Walsh, supra.
11 Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support Democracy
by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1326 (2005) (arguing that courts should
avoid rulings like Roe v. Wade and Bowers v. Hardwick because of backlash, where Roe forced
traditionalists to exit American politics, while Bowers prevented gays from entering it); Michael
J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. HIST. 81 (1994)
(analyzing backlash to Brown); Cass R. Sunstein, Three Civil Rights Fallacies, 79 CALIF. L. REV.
751, 766 (1991) (discussing backlash against Roe v. Wade and attributing the birth of the Moral
Majority to the case). See also SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST
AMERICAN WOMEN 230–31 (1991).
12 Cf. Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42
HARV. C.R.–C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007). Responding to Eskridge, Klarman, and Sunstein, supra
note 11, Post and Siegel propose a theory on democratic constitutionalism to rebut concerns
about backlash, noting:
Although the costs of backlash are well recognized, democratic constitutionalism
identifies certain underappreciated benefits of backlash. Backlash can promote
constitutional solidarity and invigorate the democratic legitimacy of constitutional
interpretation.
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Moreover, such federalism conflicts call for more serious attention
to the broader international context, not only because they are
inherently transnational, but also because these conflicts represent
responses to the types of problems John Hart Ely aptly described to
justify court intervention when political markets systematically
malfunction. 13 This Article adapts Ely’s concept. While his theory
focused on judicial review (horizontal separation of powers), I use his
concept of political market failure as a basis for a theory of federalism
(vertical separation of powers).
In particular, I examine two forms of political market failures 14 to
explain—and support—a turn to lawmaking from below (and where
possible, from above) the level of nation-state. The first type of political
market failure this Article explores—in the immigration context—
results when minorities are not only underrepresented, but also
systematically locked out of political power, 15 leading to a “tyranny of
the majority.” 16 The second form of political market failure I examine—
in the climate context—represents the exact opposite problem: here,
influential minorities (in this case, the fossil fuel industry and other
powerful economic interests) “dominate the political process, and the
Post & Siegel, supra, at 376.
13 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 103
(1980). Ely famously notes:
Malfunction occurs when the process is undeserving of trust, when (1) the ins are
choking off the channels of political change to ensure that they will stay in and the
outs will stay out, or (2) though no one is actually denied a voice or a vote,
representatives beholden to an effective majority are systematically disadvantaging
some minority out of simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recognize
commonalities of interest, and thereby denying that minority the protection afforded
other groups by a representative system.
Id.
14 I am adapting these two types of political market failures from an analysis of five forms
that justify judicial intervention, identified by Niels Petersen. NIELS PETERSEN,
PROPORTIONALITY AND JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ADJUDICATION IN
CANADA, GERMANY, AND SOUTH AFRICA 13–34 (2017) (applying John Hart Ely by elaborating
on various types of political market failures justifying judicial intervention). Following Ely,
Petersen focuses on judicial intervention, while my focus is on federalism. For discussion of
other scholars who have extended the market analogy to the political process, see infra Part I.
15 See ELY, supra note 13, at 103.
16 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 183 (Harvey C. Mansfield & Delba
Winthrop trans., 2000) (1835).
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public has to be protected against legislative capture” 17 or (as with
climate policy) regulatory capture (within the executive branch).
Bringing international law theory to federalism debates, this Article
argues that federal law can be shaped from above and below—not only
as a check on federal power, but also as a way to address entrenched
market failures in our national political process. With regards to
lawmaking from above, as discussed infra in Section III.A, while an
earlier wave of sanctuary policies explicitly invoked international law,
current policies do not18—as mentioned, an important contrast with the
climate context. In terms of lawmaking from below, federalism can be
either cooperative or uncooperative. 19 But, the idea of divided
government is not simply structure for structure’s sake, as the notion of
“dual sovereignty” might imply, but, ultimately, as the Framers
envisioned, it is about preserving popular sovereignty—to maintain a
government accountable to the People and that respects individual
rights. 20 At the same time, the raison d’etre for international law is, inter
alia, to address collective action failures (such as climate change) and to
bring international scrutiny to questions once considered the exclusive

PETERSEN, supra note 14, at 19.
As noted infra in Section III.B, an earlier wave of city ordinances explicitly invoked the
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (and focused on political refugees—in contrast to
economic immigrants—to the extent the distinction holds). While current policies do not
invoke international law, at least some sanctuary jurisdictions justify their protective policies
based on commitment to values that are protected in international human rights law—
including protections against racial profiling, measures to sustain inclusive communities,
human dignity, family rights, due process, and fairness.
19 Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J.
1256 (2009). For a discussion of the “cooperative federalism structure of [the] EPA’s recent
Clean Power Plan” along with other cooperative examples, see generally Kirsten H. Engel,
Democratic Environmental Experimentalism, 35 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 57 (2017). For a
conceptual discussion of uncooperative federalism as illustrative of the value of “disloyalty,” see
generally Heather K. Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, 62 DUKE L.J. 1349 (2013) (adapting
the ideas from ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970)).
20 As James Madison said of the checks and balances built into our constitutional system, to
protect rights, “[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 51
(James Madison).
17
18
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domain of the nation-state (such as human rights, including minority
rights, the very concern that is at the heart of Ely’s theory). 21
However, constitutional and international law scholars often talk
past each other, failing to draw on the insights from the other field.
Within constitutional law, a rethinking is underway to push
constitutional theorists to reconceptualize the way we conceive of
federalism. For example, as Heather Gerken argues that since
sovereignty was long ago declared dead, 22 we need a new intellectual
framework—“Federalism 3.0”—that rejects the notion of states and the
federal government as dual sovereigns confined to separate spheres, 23
and instead recognizes that they now “regulate shoulder-to-shoulder”24
and often influence each other. In this rethinking, however, federalism
scholars have yet to closely examine the role of international law in
eroding the traditional notion of government sovereignty and the
relevance of this for the reconceiving of federalism.
Conversely, international law and international relations scholars
have examined the disaggregation of sovereignty, 25 but theorists have
not adequately applied these lessons to new questions concerning
federalism. Much ink has been spilled over how international legal
developments have effectively pierced the traditional veil of sovereignty
in areas such as trade, refugee law, antitrust regulation, humanitarian

21 U.N. Charter art. 1. Along with maintaining international peace and security more
broadly, the U.N. Charter states that the primary purposes of the U.N. includes achieving
“international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or
humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion[.]” Id. ¶ 3.
22 Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1695, 1698 (2017) (noting
“sovereignty has been declared ‘dead’ so many times”).
23 Id. at 1696–98 (calling for an updated approach to federalism that moves beyond the
constitutional theory constituted in the wake of the New Deal, reinscribing accounts of state
sovereignty with those of state autonomy (Federalism 1.0) and moving past the rights/structure
dichotomy that emerged in the debate over the legacy of the Civil Rights Era (Federalism 2.0)).
24 Id. at 1722.
25 See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 PENN. ST. INT’L L.
REV. 745 (2006); Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up International Lawmaking: Reflections on the
New Haven School of International Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 393 (2007); Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Disaggregated Sovereignty: Towards the Public Accountability of Global Government Networks,
39 GOV’T & OPPOSITION 159 (2004); GLOBAL URBAN JUSTICE: THE RISE OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CITIES 9 (Barbara Oomen et al. eds., 2016).
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law, and human rights. 26 As Lou Henkin famously said of sovereignty,
“Away with the ‘S’ word!” 27 However, debates within foreign relations
scholarship (such as the status of international law in the United States)
turn on the type of outdated notions of federalism 28 that new
approaches to federalism persuasively criticize.
Drawing on international law and international relations theory,
this Article fills a conceptual gap in the existing federalism literature,
which focuses on the two levels of federal and sub-federal governments.
This Article adds international governance as the third level, illustrating
how international, national, and subnational institutional regimes 29 can

26 Respectively, see, for example, John O. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World
Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511 (2000) (discussing how international trade law
infringes on sovereignty); Joan Fitzpatrick, The International Dimension of U.S. Refugee Law,
15 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1 (1997) (recognizing the shortcomings of U.S. conformity with
international norms, while also noting the ways international refugee law has penetrated U.S.
sovereignty through statutory incorporation of international standards, including, for example,
the Refugee Act of 1980, to conform with the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees);
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L.
283, 285–95 (2004) (describing the “new sovereignty,” a sovereignty separated from classic
Westphalian sovereignty, as one which allows for a “transgovernmental network approach to
global antitrust regulation”); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Security, Solidarity, and Sovereignty: The
Grand Themes of UN Reform, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 619, 625 (2005) (discussing the evolution of
sovereignty as a right to sovereignty as a responsibility, for example, in the context of the
international Responsibility to Protect doctrine, which reflects the protection of civilians as a
matter of international concern, given that international law has pierced the veil of
sovereignty); Ruti G. Teitel, Humanity’s Law: Rule of Law for the New Global Politics, 35
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 355, 385 (2002) (noting that contemporary international humanitarian and
human rights law “penetrating national sovereignty” is seen as justified intervention).
27 See, e.g., Louis Henkin, The Mythology of Sovereignty, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. NEWSL., Mar
1993, at 1; Louis Henkin, War and Terrorism: Law or Metaphor, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 817,
818 n.2 (2005) (noting he “was particularly troubled by the invocation of ‘state sovereignty’ in
argument against an international law of human rights”); Louis Henkin, That “S” Word:
Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 1 (1999)
(“I don’t like the “S word.” Its birth is illegitimate, and it has not aged well.”); Anne-Marie
Slaughter & Catherine Powell, Louis Henkin (1917–2010): The Power of His Ideas Live On,
OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 22, 2010), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/10/22/louis-henkin-1917-2010-thepower-of-his-ideas-live-on [https://perma.cc/W9P9-LVZ3] (discussing this insight as a central
part of Henkin’s legacy).
28 For my own critique of this tendency in the international law and foreign affairs
scholarship, see generally Powell, supra note 10.
29 In a sense, this Article builds off of Robert Putnam’s classic game-theoretical model
recognizing that national-level policymakers face two separate constituencies when making
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catalyze one another to address fundamental political market failures.
As today’s climate and immigration debates demonstrate, policies
developed within (and between) these three levels are often deeply
intertwined. Importantly, the direction of influence moves in multiple
directions. For example, while today, state and local governments are
paving the way in addressing climate change, some national leaders are
calling for a “green new deal” 30—raising the possibility of national
leadership on climate policy if these calls can be eventually adopted into
federal policy.
To demonstrate the relevance of international law and
international relations theory to federalism, I build on the theory of
dialogic federalism, which I have elaborated elsewhere. 31 This Article
looks beyond dialogue to explore how international norms inevitably
seep in, not only through traditional top-down treaty ratification, but
also through “multiple ports of entry” 32 that enable bottom-up and
horizontal forms of governance. While in recent years, scholarly
analyses of bottom-up governance and popular constitutionalism have
decisions: domestic-level groups and international-level groups. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy
and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427 (1988).
30 Miles Kampf-Lassin, Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez Are Pushing a Bold
New Plan to Tackle Climate Change, IN THESE TIMES (Dec. 4, 2018), http://inthesetimes.com/
article/21615/bernie-sanders-alexandria-ocasio-cortez-climate-town-hall-green-new-deal
[https://perma.cc/L7ZX-P4ZZ]. Note that since the notion of a green new deal gained
prominence with the 2018 midterm election of Alexandra Ocasio-Cortez—largely following the
period this author wrote the bulk of the present Article—the green new deal is not a focus here.
While the idea of the green new deal is potentially quite important for moving climate policy
toward addressing climate justice, the scope of this potential (and how it fits into the questions
of federalism posed here) is not yet fully clear to this author.
31 Powell, supra note 10, at 249–50, 253 (adapting critique developed in the habeas corpus
context to fit the international human rights law context, based on Robert M. Cover & T.
Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035,
1047 (1977)). In dialogic federalism, intergovernmental relations are a way to embrace, rather
than avoid, conflict and indeterminacy. By envisioning a dialogic approach to work through
policy differences, dialogic federalism calls for the involvement of numerous stakeholders and
multiple levels of government as a way to more democratically and effectively incorporate
international law into U.S. law. Id. at 249, 253. See also Robert M. Cover, The Uses of
Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ideology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639, 640,
642–43 (1981).
32 This phrase draws inspiration from Judith Resnick’s Article on this notion. Judith
Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple
Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006).
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become widespread among constitutional law theorists, 33 in fact, similar
ideas of devolution and decentralized authority animate core doctrine in
international law as well. 34
“States’ rights” were once regularly invoked by states in the U.S.
South to resist racial justice and civil rights. 35 Today, federalism no
longer has a definitive ideological valence. It would be, of course, naïve
to say that “states’ rights” are no longer used to reject civil rights. But
with the diffusion of the rights idea, 36 today’s state and local
governments occasionally embrace localism to protect human rights. 37
33 For classics in this area, see, for example, Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A
Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998); LARRY D. KRAMER,
THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
34 Devolution and decentralization are pervasive in international law doctrine, including in
notions such as, for example, (1) complementarity in the International Criminal Court statute
and (2) subsidiarity in E.U. law. On complementarity, see, for example, The Principle of
Complementarity and the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction for Core International Crimes, F.
FOR INT’L CRIM. & HUMANITARIAN L. (Sept. 4, 2009), https://www.fichl.org/activities/theprinciple-of-complementarity-and-the-exercise-of-universal-jurisdiction-for-core-inter
national-crimes [https://perma.cc/QV7N-ZGRU] (“The complementarity principle on which
the International Criminal Court (ICC) is based entails that the ICC can only investigate and
prosecute core international crimes when national jurisdictions are unable or unwilling to do so
genuinely.”). On subsidiarity, see Charles F. Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, Learning from Difference:
The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the European Union 6 (European
Governance Papers, Paper No. C-07-02 May 10, 2007), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/
Jonathan_Zeitlin/publication/28627560_Learning_from_Difference_The_New_Architecture_
of_Experimentalist_Governance_in_the_European_Union/links/54060ec30cf2bba34c1e3ccf/
Learning-from-Difference-The-New-Architecture-of-Experimentalist-Governance-in-theEuropean-Union.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DBL-486S] (citing earlier work by E.U. scholar
Gráinne de Búrca, and noting, “Subsidiarity in this architecture implies that in writing
framework rules the lower-level units should be given sufficient autonomy in implementing the
rules to be able to propose changes to them”). See also Levit, supra note 25.
35 See, e.g., Governor George Wallace of Ala., Inaugural Address (Jan. 14, 1963)
(“Segregation now, segregation forever”).
36 Cf. LOUIS HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY 22 (1978) (describing how the rights idea
became increasingly internationalized and universalized); LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS
(1990) (same).
37 For a discussion of an example of localism as a mode of implementing human rights, see,
for example, Catherine Powell, Lifting Our Veil of Ignorance: Culture, Constitutionalism, and
Women’s Human Rights in Post-September 11 America, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 331, 378–83 (2005)
(discussing state and local “adoption” of human rights treaties, where the federal government
has refused to, for instance on women’s human rights). As Gerken notes, rights and federalism
are not necessarily at odds with each other, but are “interlocking gears in a disaggregated
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The questions facing courts and other legal decision-makers are who
gets to decide these pressing policy questions, and whether and how the
country can tolerate a multitude of responses. 38
Part I outlines the theoretical framework for this Article as well as
its limitations. This Part analyzes the two forms of market failure in our
national political process: (1) regulatory capture by influential minority
economic interests (such as the fossil fuel industry in the climate
context), and (2) systematic minority underrepresentation and
vulnerability driven by outright hostility (in the immigrant context).
Part II examines how—by shifting from a top-down centralized
approach to a bottom-up decentralized approach—environmental
governance is addressing the first type of market failure (regarding
overrepresentation), both from above and below the nation-state. By
contrast, Part III identifies how sanctuary jurisdiction policies respond
to John Hart Ely’s insight about the second type of market failure
(underrepresentation of minority rights), though the response here is
primarily from below the nation-state, not from above. Part IV presents
my conclusions on how federalism and international law would ideally
work together to address political market failures, as they currently do
in the climate policy context but not the immigration context.
As both case studies suggest, the value of federalism operates not
only as an essential lynchpin of our democracy within the elaborate
structure of our constitutional law, but also as a mechanism to address
entrenched failures in our national politics—whether at the federal or
sub-federal level. Where international standards are available to help
further address these failures—particularly for issues that are inherently
transnational—federalism can also serve a vital function in advancing
international law norms, by facilitating internalization of international

democracy.” Gerken, supra note 22, at 1713. See also Olatunde C.A. Johnson, The Local Turn;
Innovation and Diffusion in Civil Rights Law, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 115 (2016) (noting
innovative responses by states and localities to inequality, as the prospect of sweeping new
federal civil rights measures fades); Heather K. Gerken, Windsor’s Mad Genius: The
Interlocking Gears of Rights and Structure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 587 (2015).
38 As discussed below, the dilemma is reflected both in the climate change context (with
regard to the dispute over the Trump administration’s plan to withdraw California’s waiver for
more stringent automobile emissions standards) and in the immigration context (as reflected in
suits and counter suits between states and the federal government over sanctuary policies). See
infra Parts II &III, respectively.
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norms locally and by even assisting in fulfillment of these norms on the
global stage. 39 Again, while the climate policy case study demonstrates
the important ways that federalism and international legal norms can
support each other, this is less so in the case of immigration policy,
where international protection is less robust. Therefore, the federalism
debate in immigration turns primarily on domestic allocation of power
considerations—and thus on the issue of noncooperation with the
federal government40—as formal international human rights (and
domestic constitutional rights) legal protections of these individuals are
quite weak. As such, these two case studies set up an interesting contrast
at the intersection of federalism, constitutionalism, and
internationalism.
I. ADAPTING ELY’S NOTION OF CORRECTING POLITICAL MARKET FAILURE
This Part analyzes two forms of political market failures to
explain—and defend—the turn to lawmaking from below (and above,
where possible) the nation-state to challenge: 41 (1) minority
39 While my earlier work examined how federalism can assist with internationalization of
international norms, this Article goes further in theorizing how the interaction of federalism
and international standards addresses political failures.
40 In his canonical article on sanctuary policies, Huyen Pham frames these policies in terms
of noncooperation. Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty
and the Federal Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373 (2006).
41 Note that while this account of political market failures draws inspiration from and
adapts the theories of judicial review identified by John Hart Ely and Niels Petersen (discussed
supra in the Introduction), several other scholars have extended the market analogy to the
political process. Notably, see Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets:
Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 646 (1998) (warning that
“[i]n political markets, anticompetitive entities alter the rules of engagement to protect
established powers from the risk of successful challenge” and noting that “[t]his market analogy
may be pushed one step further if we view elected officials and dominant parties as a
managerial class, imperfectly accountable through periodic review to a diffuse body of equity
holders known as the electorate.”); Michael Pal, Breakdowns in the Democratic Process and the
Law of Canadian Democracy, 57 MCGILL L.J. 299, 304–05 (2011) (noting that a court’s role
within a theory of political competition is one which “[ensures] that political insiders do not
use their existing political authority to ‘chok[e] off the channels of political change,’” and that
courts function as “antitrust regulators” in order to ensure political markets stay competitive);
and Yen-Tu Su, Retracing Political Antitrust: A Genealogy and Its Lessons, 27 J.L. & POL. 1, 8–9
(2011) (criticizing Ely’s approach for failing to capture the whole picture and discussing
political antitrust approach as another way to describe the political market approach).
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underrepresentation resulting from being systematically locked out of
political power (as with immigrants), and (2) regulatory capture by
powerful minority economic interests (as with the deregulation and
rollback of climate policy). While the first type of political market failure
results when minorities are systematically underrepresented, in the
second form of market failure, the problem is reversed, where influential
minorities dominate the political process through regulatory capture
and externalize the negative effects of policy decisions that benefit them.
Because the first type of market failure is the one scholars most associate
with John Hart Ely’s classic theory, I turn to that first, before turning to
the second form of failure. Subsequent Sections in this Part refine the
theoretical framework for the Article and point to limitations for the
analysis.
A.

Immigrants’ Rights: The Problem of Minority Underrepresentation

I start with the minority underrepresentation problem, because this
is the more familiar dilemma for both constitutional and international
law reflected: (1) in constitutional law’s protection of “discrete and
insular minorities” (as the Supreme Court identified in Carolene
Products), as well as (2) in international law’s bill of rights. 42 Noncitizen
42 In constitutional law, see, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4
(1938). In international law, see, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art.
2, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; id. art. 26. See also U.N. Charter art. 1,
¶ 3; International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar.
7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
The treatment of foreign nationals as “minorities” (including religious minorities and
prisoners of war) was among the earliest concerns in international human rights law and
continues to be at the center of efforts to prevent international conflict and warfare. Protections
for foreign nationals who are religious minorities (in the foreign country) came to fruition in
the twentieth century inter-war period, when Central and Eastern European countries adopted
minority rights regimes for religious and linguistic minorities in the aftermath of World War I.
For example, see the famous case Minority Schools in Albania, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 64
(Apr. 6) (advisory opinion) (as the precursor to the International Court of Justice, the
Permanent Court of International Justice highlighted the importance of protections in the
Minorities Treaties for religious, linguistic, and racial minorities, such as the Christian minority
of Greek origin in predominantly Muslim Albania). As for protections of foreign nationals as
prisoners of war, see THEODOR MERON, BLOODY CONSTRAINT: WAR AND CHIVALRY IN
SHAKESPEARE (1998) (tracing humanitarian norms back to at least Shakespearean times, as
reflected in Shakespeare’s plays revealing norms of the times); Theodor Meron, The
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immigrants are quintessential outsiders. 43 Ely recognizes that a root
cause of vulnerability for noncitizens is their exclusion from the formal
political process—such that “any representation they receive will be
exclusively ‘virtual.’” 44 As David Cole notes:
As a group that is subject to government regulation but denied a
vote, aliens are without a meaningful voice in the political bargains
struck by our representative system. Members of Congress have little
reason to concern themselves with the rights and interests of those
who cannot vote. Thus, as John Hart Ely has argued, aliens’ interests
will almost by definition be undercounted in the political process;
they are a “relatively easy case” of a “discrete and insular minority”
deserving of heightened protection. 45

In addition to being disenfranchised politically, noncitizens are largely
barred from running for national office. 46 Further, noncitizens have

Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 239 (2000) (reflecting on the evolution
of international humanitarian law’s treatment of prisoners of war from the Hague Convention
to the Geneva Convention and beyond).
43 Further, many Latinx (and other) citizens are sometimes presumed to be undocumented
immigrants and are often treated as outsiders on this basis, when, for example, stopped by the
police based on their skin color and/or appearance. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Chacón, Producing
Liminal Legality, 92 DENV. U. L. REV. 709, 753 (2015) (“citizens who are policed more heavily
because they bear the visible markers of race or ethnicity that correlate to other forms of liminal
legal status”); Jennifer M. Chacón, Citizenship Matters: Conceptualizing Belonging in an Era of
Fragile Inclusions, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 64 (2018) [hereinafter Chacón, Conceptualizing
Belonging] (“formal citizenship does not protect people from discriminatory policing”). It is
well-documented that racial profiling is an entrenched problem—posing serious and
unconstitutional over- and under-inclusivity challenges—both inside and outside the context of
immigration. See, e.g., David A. Harris, “Driving While Black” and All Other Traffic Offenses:
The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544 (1997);
Stefano Bonino, How Discrimination Against Muslims at Airports Actually Hurts the Fight
Against Terrorism, WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
monkey-cage/wp/2016/08/26/how-discrimination-against-muslims-at-airports-actually-hurtsthe-fight-against-terrorism/?utm_term=.5e927210b144 [https://perma.cc/G9AB-SLGP].
44 ELY, supra note 13, at 161–62.
45 David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 981 (2002).
46 Id. at 981 n.114 (“Interestingly, while citizenship is a constitutional prerequisite to
running for president or Congress, the political branches, it is not a requirement for those who
make up the federal judiciary responsible for enforcing constitutional rights.”); see also ELY,
supra note 13, at 161 (“our legislatures are composed almost entirely of citizens who have
always been such”). But see Chacón, Conceptualizing Belonging, supra note 43, at 57–58

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3155282

Powell.40.6.6 (Do Not Delete)

2700

7/15/2019 4:43 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:2685

faced considerable prejudice throughout our history and often live in
somewhat discrete and unassimilated communities. 47
The argument made by Ely and Cole is an argument about how the
underrepresentation of noncitizens in our political system is classic
political market failure. Noncitizens are subject to government
regulation, but do not have a meaningful voice or vote in the
formulation of its regulation. Of course, social contract theory could be
used to justify the exclusion of noncitizens from being able to formally
participate in the political process, though behind a Rawlsian veil of
ignorance, we are all potential immigrants. 48 But as I read Ely and Cole,
their argument is less about granting a formal voice or vote to
undocumented immigrants and more a contention for constitutional
rights protection and judicial intervention to vindicate basic rights. 49
The fact that undocumented immigrants meet the classic criteria of
minority status highlights the need for both constitutional rights
protection and a heightened standard of review by courts. 50
For the purposes of my analysis regarding federalism, this Article
takes the point Ely and Cole make about the importance of horizontal
separation of powers, and adapts it to offer new insight about vertical
separation of powers. Noncitizens are underrepresented in our national
political process, even as they are subject to federal authority. 51
Of course, immigration law is inherent in national sovereignty, 52
and one might argue that immigrants who are out-of-status 53 are not
(discussing ways immigrants are active politically beyond the formal ability to vote or run for
office).
47 Cole, supra note 45, at 981 n.113.
48 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1999).
49 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 45, at 981 (“[T]he fact that the Constitution denies aliens the
right to vote makes it that much more essential that the basic rights reflected in the Bill of
Rights be extended to aliens in our midst.”).
50 Id. at 981; ELY, supra note 13, at 103.
51 On this point, note Justice Brennan’s dissent from (and criticism of) the idea advocated
by the majority of the Court that “although foreign nationals must abide by our laws even when
in their own countries, our Government need not abide by the Fourth Amendment when it
investigates them for violations of our laws.” United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259,
279 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Brennan argued that the Fourth
Amendment focuses “on what the Government can and cannot do, and how it may act, not on
against whom these actions may be taken.” Id. at 288 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
52 Immigration is understood as bound up in the federal government’s control over matters
related to sovereignty. See, e.g., Jennifer Gordon, Immigration as Commerce: A New Look at the
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entitled to the protection afforded those who are in-status. At the same
time, there are broader questions about how federal immigration laws
are conceived of and enforced, which are beyond the scope of this
Article. 54 But once immigrants are in the United States and making
substantial contributions to the economy and the fabric of various
communities, other questions arise concerning their rights and status. 55

Federal Immigration Power and the Constitution, 93 IND. L.J. 653, 654 (2018) (“For well over a
century, federal courts have often relied on the theory that the immigration authority is rooted
in the Constitution’s grant to the federal government of control over matters related to
sovereignty and foreign affairs.”).
53 I am using the terms “out-of-status” and “undocumented” immigrants to describe
immigrants who were either unauthorized to enter the United States or stay beyond their
authorization. I prefer the “out-of-status” and “undocumented” terminology, as there are a
variety of reasons immigrants are in the country without proper documentation. Many
immigrants try to enter legally but end up with unscrupulous lawyers who fail to take the
necessary steps to assist immigrants normalize their status.
More fundamentally, U.S. involvement in many parts of world undercuts the argument
that the United States bears no responsibility and obligation to immigrants seeking to come to
the United States. Garrett Hardin famously uses the metaphor of “lifeboat ethics” to assert that
the carrying capacity of each country depends upon its ability to help immigrants from poor
countries without causing great detriment to those already in the metaphorical boat. See Garrett
Hardin, Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor, GARRETT HARDIN SOC’Y (Sept.
1974), http://www.garretthardinsociety.org/articles/art_lifeboat_ethics_case_against_helping_
poor.html [https://perma.cc/J3B5-MBSN]. However, U.S. responsibility for underdevelopment
in other countries might change the calculus in Hardin’s famous tragedy of the commons
framework. Those in the U.S. lifeboat may have helped create the leaky conditions in the other
boat. For a discussion of the negative impacts of U.S.-led economic and trade policies in Latin
America, see CHANTAL THOMAS, DISORDERLY BORDERS: HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW SHAPES
IRREGULAR MIGRATION 71 (forthcoming under contract with Oxford Univ. Press) (on file with
author) (chapter 2.1) (exploring the idea that the United States has particular obligations to
immigrants from Latin America, given the impact of structural adjustment and trade
liberalization (often referred to the Washington Consensus) in countries throughout Central
and South America). For a discussion of the negative impacts of U.S. and European colonialism
and imperialism in less powerful parts of the world, see ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM,
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); Tony Anghie & Wayne
McCormack, The Rights of Aliens: Legal Regimes and Historical Perspectives, in MIGRATION IN
THE 21ST CENTURY: RIGHTS, OUTCOMES AND POLICY 23 (Thomas N. Maloney & Kim Korineck
eds., 2011).
54 Note that other scholars are involved in exploring important questions of postnational
membership, such as in the European Union context. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN JOPPKE, CITIZENSHIP
AND IMMIGRATION (2010).
55 See, e.g., Chacón, Conceptualizing Belonging, supra note 43; see also Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202 (1982) (recognizing that undocumented children could not be denied access to public
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Through sanctuary policies, state, county, and local governments
assert an interest in building trust with immigrant communities to
advance pragmatic law enforcement and local sovereignty objectives, as
well as to promote altruistic values regarding building diverse, inclusive
communities, and vindicating human dignity. The aim of respecting the
rights of individuals simply by virtue of each person’s humanity is not a
foreign idea. In fact, it was a concept established as a fundamental
political and constitutional ideal at the founding of the United States, 56
and was later promoted internationally by the United States—across
Republican and Democratic administrations—in the aftermath of the
Nazi Holocaust, through the Cold War, and up through today. 57 In
short, whether based on considerations of altruism or pragmatism, by
refusing cooperation with the federal government’s restrictive
immigration policies, sanctuary jurisdictions address the failure in our
national politics of subjecting noncitizens to increasingly draconian
federal government regulations, particularly where noncitizens do not
have an effective voice or vote in the formulation of these regulations. 58
schools, on equal protection grounds, as to deny them access would be to create a permanent
underclass living in our midst).
56 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776) (declaring that “all men are created
equal” and “are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights”). The American
Declaration and U.S. Constitution—overlaid with social contract theory—eventually
secularized the idea of rights, which started out as a natural law idea based in religion. See
HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY, supra note 36, at 22.
57 See, e.g., MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2001); HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY,
supra note 36; Michelle Singer, Ford’s Grades for Carter, Reagan, Nixon, CBS NEWS (Jan. 12,
2007, 10:38 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fords-grades-for-carter-reagan-nixon
[https://perma.cc/9T8Y-PLFJ] (Gerald Ford contended his negotiation of the Helsinki Accord
on human rights did more to win the Cold War than Reagan’s Pentagon buildup); Felicia
Schwartz, In Cuba Policy Shift, Trump Stresses Human Rights, Mutes Concerns Elsewhere, WALL
STREET J. (June 17, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-cuba-policy-shift-trumpstresses-human-rights-mutes-concerns-elsewhere-1497697200 [https://perma.cc/6GJ9-AZ4G];
Kevin Liptak & Dan Merica, For Trump, A Selective Focus on Human Rights, CNN: POL. (June
17, 2017, 8:32 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/06/17/politics/trump-human-rightscuba/index.html [https://perma.cc/UG8Y-TJW5].
58 Note there is a debate on the extent to which sanctuary policy is or is not about
“resistance” and obstruction. Compare Jason A. Cade, Sanctuaries as Equitable Delegation in an
Era of Mass Immigration Enforcement, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 433, 433 (2018) (stating that rather
than view sanctuary “as obstructions to the operation of federal immigration law[,]” the better
view is that “the sanctuary movement comports with, rather than fights against, dominant new
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Climate Policy: The Problem of Regulatory Capture by Influential
Economic Minorities

As for the second form of political market failure, climate policy
reflects regulatory capture by powerful minority economic interests,
particularly the fossil fuel industry. Some leaders within the industry
have successfully pushed the Trump administration to reverse federal
climate change policies that these leaders claim threaten the economic
future of coal and other fossil fuels. 59 While there is a movement away
from fossil fuels to cleaner sources of energy on purely economic grounds
(to compete with China, Europe, and other parts of the world that are
making strides in clean energy, as the economy of tomorrow, rather
than the economy of the last century), 60 many fossil fuel companies are
resistant to this transition and efforts to be regulated.
The problem of regulatory capture by powerful minority economic
interests does not necessarily fit squarely within either the John Hart Ely
or Carolene Products frameworks. However, Bruce Ackerman notes the
“discrete and insular minority” framing could actually be interpreted as
over-inclusive (in that small, but powerful economic interests, could, in
fact, be swept within the notion of “discrete and insular,” but clearly did
themes in federal immigration law . . . [by] erect[ing] front-line equitable screens, promot[ing]
procedural fairness, and act[ing] as last-resort circuit breakers in the administration of federal
deportation law.”), with Rose Cuison Villazor & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Sanctuary Networks,
103 MINN. L. REV. 1209 (2019).
59 See, e.g., Jeff Brady, Fossil Fuel Industry Pushes for Clean Power Plant Replacement, NPR
(Dec. 21, 2017, 4:55 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/12/21/572699233/fossil-fuel-industrypush-for-clean-power-plan-replacement [https://perma.cc/DCV6-TMNN]; Jared Keller, Oil
and Gas Ties Run Deep in the Trump Administration, PAC. STANDARD (Jan. 5, 2018), https://
psmag.com/environment/oil-and-gas-ties-run-deep-in-trump-administration
[https://
perma.cc/AZS2-AXPY] (discussing how policy and political connections affect industry).
60 Frank Jossi, Sustainable: Presenting the Business Case for Clean Energy, FIN. & COM.
(June 6, 2017, 7:02 AM), https://finance-commerce.com/2017/06/sustainable-presenting-thebusiness-case-for-clean-energy [https://perma.cc/KG3X-3AMJ]; RENEWABLE CHOICE ENERGY,
THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY: WHY COMPANIES ARE CHOOSING POWER
PURCHASE AGREEMENTS (2017), http://www.renewablechoice.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/
01/Economic-Case-for-Renewable-Energy-White-Paper-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9TY4XXWG]; Daniel Kammen, A Letter to Mr. Trump: The Economic Case for Energy, Equity and
Climate Leadership, U.C. BERKELEY BLOG: ENV’T (Nov. 15, 2016), http://blogs.berkeley.edu/
2016/11/15/a-letter-to-mr-trump-the-economic-case-for-energy-equity-and-climate-leadership
[https://perma.cc/G2UT-TQ6F].
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not qualify for heightened judicial scrutiny in the famous footnote) and
under-inclusive (in that it was unclear that women, for example, fit
squarely in the original conception). 61
For this reason, Ackerman critiques the “discrete and insular
minority” notion, arguing, “Other things being equal, ‘discreteness and
insularity’ will normally be a source of enormous bargaining advantage,
not disadvantage, for a group engaged in pluralist American politics.”62
While the Supreme Court has moved from the “discrete and
insular minority” framework to other criteria, 63 it is nonetheless useful
to flip this framework on its head, per Ackerman’s intuition, at least as a
conceptual matter (if not a doctrinal matter) to consider how powerful
minority economic interests have an unfair advantage (as opposed to an
unfair disadvantage, the way other minority groups have).
Another way to think about regulatory capture by powerful
minority economic elites as a form of political market failure is through
the lens of Reynolds v. Sims. 64 According to that landmark case, the
normative baseline for fairness in the political process in our democracy
is “one person, one vote.” 65 However, money and corporate influence
distort this baseline, particularly in the aftermath of Citizens United v.
Federal Electric Commission, which protected political spending as free
speech. 66 Disproportionate political influence—grounded in economic
power that helps secure political access through campaign
contributions, etc.—is not only in tension with the “one person, one
vote” notion, but also leads to informational asymmetries (as discussed
further infra). As Alexander Meiklejohn notes, speech contributes to the

Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985).
Id. at 723–24 (adding “the concerns that underlie Carolene should lead judges to protect
groups that possess the opposite characteristics from the ones Carolene emphasizes—groups
that are ‘anonymous and diffuse’ rather than ‘discrete and insular.’”).
63 Due to conceptual problems with applying the “discrete and insular minority”
framework, the Supreme Court has moved toward criteria such as immutability, historical
disadvantage, and others. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973).
64 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
65 Id. at 558.
66 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that political spending is protected speech under the First
Amendment).
61
62
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democratic process, 67 yet there must be a level playing ground.
Particularly in an era of digital media, powerful actors are even more
likely to wield greater power over speech and political influence. 68
Despite overwhelming scientific evidence, 69 President Trump
tweeted, “The concept of global warming was created by and for the
Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive.” 70 No
evidence to support this claim has been produced, yet when asked about
this statement, administration officials have largely evaded defending
the core of the claim, suggesting instead that the problem the President
was trying to highlight was a more general concern about
competitiveness. 71
At the November 2017 two-year anniversary meeting of the 2015
Paris climate change agreement, the Trump administration’s only public
meeting on climate change focused on the future of the coal sector. 72
Whereas deregulation and support for a more open economy 73 is a
credible “neutral principle” 74—to use Herbert Weschler’s terminology—
President Trump has spearheaded efforts to end regulations on climate
policy that supports the fossil fuel sector, while at the same time going
in a somewhat inconsistent direction as regards deregulation in the

67 ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
(2001).
68 See On the Media: Is the 1st Amendment Obsolete?, N.Y. PUB. RADIO (Sept. 7, 2018)
(downloaded using iTunes) (interview with Timothy Wu, discussing ideas that appear in
Timothy Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, in THE FREE SPEECH CENTURY (Lee C.
Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2018)).
69 For discussion of the scientific research, see discussion infra Part II.
70 Tom DiChristopher, Climate Change Deniers Are Plotting Trump’s Path to the Holy Grail
of Deregulation, CNBC (Nov. 22, 2017, 11:15 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/22/climatechange-deniers-plot-trumps-path-to-deregulation.html [https://perma.cc/GK2H-8ZU4].
71 Umair Irfan, The Trump Administration Went to the UN Climate Talks to Promote Coal,
VOX (Nov. 14, 2017, 9:20 AM), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/11/14/
16634480/us-coal-nuclear-climate-change-cop23-protest
[https://perma.cc/4NG2-VVPA]
(noting that when a Chinese reporter asked a Trump advisor about Trump’s “Chinese hoax”
tweet, the response was that the point of tweet was mostly about competitiveness).
72 Id.
73 Tracking Deregulation in the Trump Era, BROOKINGS (May 16, 2019), https://
www.brookings.edu/interactives/tracking-deregulation-in-the-trump-era
[https://perma.cc/
PVH8-L4BA].
74 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1959).
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context of steel. For example, in March 2018, Trump announced tariffs
on steel imports, designed to protect the steel sector. 75 Such
inconsistency in following the principle of deregulation is telling. The
President’s policy choices seem, instead, consistent in his commitment
to protecting at least certain sectors of the economy—fossil fuels and
steel—that are geographically concentrated in white, working class,
and/or more conservative parts of the country that support him (such as
Texas and the rust belt). 76
This is a classic example of how a policy that is “inconsistent or
incoherent in pursuing certain goals” (in this case a claimed neutral
principle of deregulation that Trump frequently asserts as a primary
goal of his administration) “can [] be an indication that [the policy] also
pursued secondary goals, such as particularistic interests” (in this case,
the advancement of economic interests for the coal and steel sectors,
respectively). 77 The uses of such proxies are indicative of regulatory
75 Section 232 Tariffs on Aluminum and Steel, U. S CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, https://
www.cbp.gov/trade/programs-administration/entry-summary/232-tariffs-aluminum-and-steel
[https://perma.cc/PLX6-VJ75] (last updated May 29, 2019); Scott Horsley, Trump Formally
Orders Tariffs on Steel, Aluminum Imports, NPR (Mar. 8, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/
2018/03/08/591744195/trump-expected-to-formally-order-tariffs-on-steel-aluminum-imports
[https://perma.cc/HPF3-ZHKY].
76 As regards white working class voters with ties to the steel industry, see, e.g., Asma
Khalid, Steel Country Democrats Who Backed Trump Weigh Party Loyalty in 2018, NPR (Mar.
9, 2018, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/09/591014346/steel-country-democrats-whobacked-trump-weigh-party-loyalty-in-2018 [https://perma.cc/QJ4R-YJ7C]. As regards white
working class voters with possible ties to the coal sector, see, e.g., Joshua Zeitz, Does the White
Working Class Really Vote Against Its Own Interests?, POLITICO (Dec. 31, 2017), https://
www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/12/31/trump-white-working-class-history-216200
[https://perma.cc/8QLC-BB3S].
77 PETERSEN, supra note 14, at 28; see also Niels Petersen, Legislative Inconsistency and the
“Smoking Out” of Illicit Motives, 64 AM. J. COMP. L. 121, 140 (2016) (discussing how, as an
example of political market failure, a legislative majority may be captured by strong interest
groups and have incentives to draft private-regarding legislation). While applied inconsistently,
the Trump administration has made deregulation a primary policy objective. See, e.g., Fact
Sheets: President Donald J. Trump Is Delivering on Deregulation, WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 14, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-deliveringderegulation [https://perma.cc/B3MU-LE6L]; Alan Levin & Ari Natter, Trump Stretches
Meaning of Deregulation in Touting Achievements, BLOOMBERG: POL. (Dec. 29, 2017, 4:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-12-29/trump-stretches-meaning-ofderegulation-in-touting-achievements; Laurent Belsie, Trump’s Deregulation Drive Is Epic in Scale
and Scope. And Yet . . ., CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.csmonitor.com/
Business/2018/0105/Trump-s-deregulation-drive-is-epic-in-scale-and-scope.-And-yet [https://
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capture, where the decision-maker offers a proxy as a justification when
another basis is the true basis for the policy. 78
The push by certain firms within the fossil fuel industry to oppose
climate policy represents a particularly egregious political market
failure, given the outsized influence of powerful economic minorities. It
signals that those with power are able to externalize the negative effects
of policy decisions that benefit them at the expense of the rest of us.
Fossil fuel companies can benefit from gutting climate policies (at least
in the short term, by pushing off the inevitable economic forces that
serve to replace fossil fuels with clean energy), while the rest of us pay
the price of the negative effects of climate change. 79 Plus, the fossil fuel
industry’s success in lobbying the Trump administration 80 to eviscerate
perma.cc/349P-QEW2]; Nicholas W. Zeppos & Philip A. Wallach, Tracking Deregulation in the
Trump Era, BROOKINGS (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2017/12/05/
tracking-deregulation-in-the-trump-era [https://perma.cc/325W-TZ99].
78 PETERSEN, supra note 14, at 28.
79 For discussion of the negative effects of climate change, see infra Part II.
80 Furthermore, despite Trump’s promise to “drain the swamp,” several lobbyists who
represented fossil fuel companies are now in senior positions in the Trump administration,
including Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Administrator Andrew Wheeler. See, e.g.,
Coral Davenport, Trump Administration Wants to Make It Easier to Release Methane Gas into
Air, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/10/climate/methaneemissions-epa.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage
[https://
perma.cc/V93X-ZBHJ] (describing Wheeler as “a former coal lobbyist”); Lisa Friedman & Brad
Plumer, E.P.A. Drafts Rule on Coal Plants to Replace Clean Power Plan, N.Y. TIMES (July 5,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/climate/clean-power-plan-replacement.html
[https://perma.cc/L369-4NVP] (explaining that before joining the EPA, Wheeler worked as a
lobbyist for Robert E. Murray, “a mining executive and a longtime Trump donor”); Lisa
Friedman, Andrew Wheeler, New E.P.A. Chief, Details His Energy Lobbying Past, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug.
1,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/01/climate/andrew-wheeler-epalobbying.html [https://perma.cc/BBM7-A87Z] (reporting that Wheeler is serving under an
ethical cloud, having not reported related prior lobbying efforts within the two-year ban with
sufficient detail). See also Eric Lipton, E.P.A. Rule Change Could Let Dirtiest Coal Plants Keep
Running (and Stay Dirty), N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/24/
climate/epa-coal-power-scrubbers.html [https://perma.cc/VW8H-VVG8] [hereinafter Lipton,
Dirtiest Coal] (explaining that the decision to gut the Obama-era Clean Power Plan “was
advocated by William L. Wehrum, a former power-plant industry lawyer who is now in charge
of air pollution policy at the E.P.A. and had unsuccessfully sought to make a similar change
during the Bush administration, when he also worked at the agency.”); Eric Lipton, As Trump
Dismantles Clean Air Rules, An Industry Lawyer Delivers for Ex-Clients, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/19/us/politics/epa-coal-emissions-standards-williamwehrum.html [https://perma.cc/ANZ5-XD7X] (reporting “As a corporate lawyer, William L.
Wehrum worked for the better part of a decade to weaken air pollution rules by fighting the
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climate policies has effects that will be even more widely felt, given both
the broader territorial and temporal impacts. 81 Territorial external
effects of curbing climate policy include the fact that the cost will be
borne by people globally outside the United States—so by those who are
“not part of the political community making the decision.” 82 Temporal
external effects of climate change include the fact the cost of resisting
responsible climate policy now will be borne by future generations. 83
C.

Immigration and Climate Policies: Informational Asymmetries and
Markets Failures

Just as economists describe externalization of costs as indicative of
market failure, so too they note that information asymmetries are
another key symptom of such failures. 84 Scholars also view race and
other forms of impermissible discrimination as economic and political
market failures. 85 In the climate and immigration contexts, proxies,
coded-language, and dog whistles are used in ways that appeal to
particular parts of the electorate, while stigmatizing others.

Environmental Protection Agency in court on behalf of chemical manufacturers, refineries, oil
drillers and coal-burning power plants. Now, Mr. Wehrum is about to deliver one of the biggest
victories yet for his industry clients [the rollback of the Clean Power Plan]—this time from
inside the Trump administration as the government’s top air pollution official.”).
81 PETERSEN, supra note 14, at 31.
82 Id. at 31.
83 As Petersen notes:
Many of the voters who today decide about the composition of the government may
then not be alive anymore. At the same time, citizens who will feel the effect of
environmental measures that are taken (or not taken) in 20 or 30 years often do not
yet have a vote or might even not yet be born.
Id. at 32.
84 Alex Bowen, Simon Dietz & Naomi Hicks, Why Do Economists Describe Climate Change
as a ‘Market Failure’?, GUARDIAN (May 21, 2012, 10:24 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2012/may/21/economists-climate-change-market-failure
[https://perma.cc/
GUZ5-2V8Y] (making the point that economists describe externalities and lack of information
as market failures).
85 Ian Ayres, Market Power and Inequality: A Competitive Conduct Standard for Assessing
When Disparate Impacts Are Unjustified, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 669 (2007) (explaining ways in
which racial disparity and market failure often come hand in hand).
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Typically, when the government abuses its power or is
incompetent, citizens have the right to exit or replace elected
representatives in elections. 86 However, information asymmetries
undermine the ability of citizens to punish lawmakers—because it is
more difficult to vote based on accurate information—thereby
weakening accountability and the operation of the political market. The
fact that former fossil fuel lobbyists are in charge of making
environmental policy (in some cases without adequately disclosing their
past lobbying practices) distorts the truth and the basis for policy. 87
To make matters worse, efforts by the press to unmask these
dynamics, create transparency, and promote accountability have been
regularly attacked as “fake news.”88 In fact, several of the democratic
institutions in our society that are essential to the functioning of
political markets (by facilitating speech, revealing information, and
curbing abuse) have been under attack. The truth is obscured to advance
powerful economic interests; 89 science is questioned; 90 climate change
research is defunded, under attack, and obscured; 91 the authority of
See generally HIRSCHMAN, supra note 19.
See sources cited supra note 80.
88 See RonNell Andersen Jones & Lisa Grow Sun, Enemy Construction and the Press, 49
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1301 (2017) (discussing how President Trump’s attack on the press as “the
enemy” risks triggering the type of exceptionalism that has been used in the past to justify
compromise of ordinarily recognized liberties).
89 Lili Levi, The Weaponized Lawsuit Against the Media: Litigation Funding as a New
Threat to Journalism, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 761 (2017) (describing a new front in the current war
against the media—one in which billionaire private actors clandestinely fund other people’s
lawsuits in an attempt to censor press entities).
90 DiChristopher, supra note 70.
91 On the hollowing out of funding for research, see Randy Showstack, Climate Research
Funding Still Under Threat, Report Warns, EOS (June 21, 2018), https://eos.org/articles/climateresearch-funding-still-under-threat-report-warns [https://perma.cc/WZ3V-SSE2] (warning
that although congressional action reversed some of the Trump administration cuts to climate
change research funding in 2018, political appointees have “broad discretion to reprogram
funding away from climate change”); Natalie Meade, Trump’s Cuts in Climate-Change Research
Spark a Global Scramble for Funds, NEW YORKER (July 7, 2018) https://www.newyorker.com/
news/news-desk/trumps-cuts-in-climate-change-research-spark-a-global-scramble-for-funds
[https://perma.cc/VQ23-LQLZ] (noting that Trump’s 2019 budget plan cuts roughly $460
million on initiatives related to the environment). On research being attacked or obscured, see
Lisa Friedman, Cost of New E.P.A. Coal Rules: Up to 1,400 More Deaths a Year, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/climate/epa-coal-pollution-deaths.html?
emc=edit_na_20180821&nl=breaking-news&nlid=17436275ing-news&ref=cta
[https://
86
87
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federal judges is criticized; 92 political opponents are threatened with
imprisonment; 93 and “alternative facts” are promoted over actual facts. 94
D.

Federalism and Transnationalism as Correctives to Political Market
Failure

While federal law can be shaped from below and above, the
direction of influence can run in multiple directions. 95 But regardless of
any particular substantive outcome, the objective of domestic separation
of powers helps ensure competition, checks and balances, and
perma.cc/K6W7-R56J] (explaining that as the EPA “works to roll back [the Clean Power Plan]
regulations on industry, it has also taken steps to sharply restrict the way it uses data to assess
its own proposals”); Coral Davenport, Trump Administration Unveils Its Plan to Relax Car
Pollution Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/02/climate/
trump-auto-emissions-california.html
[https://perma.cc/5CHT-SEMY]
(while
the
Transportation Department’s acting administrator for the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, Heidi King, claimed that the Trump administration’s rollback of stricter
federal auto emissions standards “could save up to a thousand lives annually by reducing these
barriers that prevent consumers from getting into newer, safer cars . . . [b]ehind the scenes, Mr.
Wheeler and [E.P.A. Administrator for Air and Radiation] Mr. Wehrum have sought to
distance themselves from the auto-fatality analysis put forth by Ms. King, out of concern that
the numbers might be susceptible to legal challenge.”).
92 Karey Van Hall, Trump’s Attack on Federal Judge Could Backfire, POLITICO (Feb. 4, 2017,
1:41
PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/trump-judge-attack-backfire-234649
[https://perma.cc/XRM3-UMZA] (noting President Trump’s tweet decrying the opinion by the
Republican-appointed District Court Judge James Robart who enjoined the President’s
Executive Order suspending foreign travelers from majority Muslim countries, which Trump
referred to as “[t]he opinion of this so-called judge, which essentially takes law-enforcement
away from our country, is ridiculous and will be overturned!” and warning that “death &
destruction” could result if the President is not allowed to restrict immigration).
93 Gregory Krieg, Trump Threatens to Jail Clinton If He Wins Election, CNN: POL. (Oct. 10,
2016,
11:30
AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/10/09/politics/eric-holder-nixon-trumppresidential-debate/index.html; Meghan Keneally & Conor Finnegan, Trump Goes After Former
Clinton Aide Huma Abedin in Tweet, ABC NEWS (Jan. 3, 2018, 10:51 AM), http://
abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-clinton-aide-huma-abedin-tweet/story?id=52095019 [https://
perma.cc/QF39-XNSZ] (noting Trump tweeted, “Crooked Hillary Clinton’s top aid [sic], Huma
Abedin, has been accused of disregarding basic security protocols. She put Classified Passwords
into the hands of foreign agents . . . Jail! Deep State Justice Dept must finally act”).
94 NBC News, Kellyanne Conway: Press Secretary Sean Spicer Gave ‘Alternative Facts’,
YOUTUBE (Jan. 22, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VSrEEDQgFc8.
95 As Gerken notes, at all levels, regulatory regimes “sometimes lean[] on one another and
sometimes deliberately jostl[e] each other.” Gerken, supra note 22, at 1722–23 (speaking
domestically and internally about the two levels of federalism).
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accountability. Under the two leading theories of democracy and
separation of powers—competitive democracy and deliberative
democracy 96—federalism is viewed as an important check to address
political market failures.
Both immigration and environmental law have long been viewed as
falling within federal authority. 97 At the same time, courts have
recognized that state and local governments can play important roles in
setting boundaries on the federal government’s immigration
enforcement authority 98 and in prompting the federal government to
affirmatively act in the climate context. 99

96 For further discussion of these two theories, see PETERSEN, supra note 14, at 16–17. For a
discussion of competitive democracy, see IAN SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY
(2003). For further discussion of deliberative democracy, see JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN
FACTS AND NORMS 287–328 (1996); JAMES S. FISHKIN, DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW
DIRECTIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM (1991); AMY GUTMAN & DENNIS THOMPSON,
DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996); Dorf & Sabel, supra note 33.
97 The Supreme Court has upheld the federal government authority in regulating the
environment based on the role of the national government as a sovereign nation involved in
negotiating the global commons with other nations. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920)
(rejecting Tenth Amendment challenge to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918, on the
grounds that the federal government’s implementation of the treaty at issue was constitutional,
trumping Missouri’s concerns about limitations on Congress’s enumerated powers and
abrogation of states’ rights).
98 See, e.g., Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (granting
preliminary injunction and finding likelihood of success on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim
that President Trump’s Executive Order 13768 [threatening to defund “sanctuary
jurisdictions”] is unconstitutional on the grounds that it violates both horizontal and vertical
separation of powers concerns); City & Cty. of S.F. v. Trump, No. 17-16886, 2018 U.S. App.
LEXIS 239 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2018) (upholding the district court’s permanent injunction on the
defunding and enforcement provisions of the executive order); Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump,
267 F. Supp. 3d 1201 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (concluding that the U.S. Attorney General’s
Memorandum clarifying Trump’s executive order does not change the analysis from the PI
Order, and therefore denying the government’s motions for reconsideration); see also City of
Seattle v. Trump, No. 17-497-RAJ, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 173376 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 19, 2017)
(denying the Government’s motion to dismiss because plaintiffs are likely to succeed in
showing that the Executive Order is unduly coercive, discriminatory, and unconstitutional);
City of Chicago. v. Sessions, 264 F. Supp. 3d 933 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (granting a preliminary
injunction against the Attorney General’s imposition of notice and access conditions on the
Byrne JAG grant because if imposed, the City of Chicago will face irreparable harm regarding
its immigration policies).
99 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (agreeing with Massachusetts and the
other states, the Court found the federal EPA’s rationale for not regulating particular
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Placing this in transnational perspective, when democratic
institutions have been under assault in other countries—such as in
South Africa, Chile, and China—those who have sought to restore or
establish democracy have mobilized resistance to misguided policies not
only below the level of the nation-state, but also horizontally and
transnationally with partners abroad. 100
From time immemorial, even smaller political subunits, such as
cities, have played an important role shaping the world—“[f]rom
Athens and Rome to Paris and Venice to Baghdad and Beijing.” 101 With
state, county, and local governments across the United States paving the
way as policy innovators—addressing global dilemmas posed by climate
disruption and immigration—the old adage “act local, think global”
might apply here. However, these subnational actors have an eye to the
national, as much as they are looking to the global. Whether seeking to
influence or resist the national agenda, these subnational governments
seek to catalyze policy with the federal government, with each other,
with their own constituents and interest groups (including business,
etc.), and (at least with climate policy) with counterparts abroad.
E.

International Law as a Corrective to Political Market Failure

While federalism can play an important role in addressing political
market failures from below (and partnering transnationally with allies
abroad plays a role horizontally), international law is designed to
address such failures from above. A primary objective of international
law is to address collective action failures (such as climate change).

greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles under the Clean Air Act to be inadequate and
required the agency to articulate a reasonable basis in order to avoid regulation).
100 I am not equating the United States with these countries—as each country is unique—but
am mentioning these other examples as a way of illustrating how this notion is not an abstract
one. Consider, for example, how during apartheid in South Africa, the movement for a postapartheid democracy occurred primarily below (at the grassroots) and above (through an
international anti-apartheid movement) the nation-state, which eventually helped dismantle
national apartheid policies and transition to a nonracial democracy and new constitutional
framework.
101 Michael Bloomberg, Why Municipalities Are the Key to Fighting Climate Change,
FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2015, at 1.
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Thus, international law is sometimes used to address the problems of
regulatory capture and externalization of negative costs.
In the aftermath of World War II—and the Nazi Holocaust—
international law also brought global scrutiny to how countries treated
their own citizens as well as foreign nationals—questions once
considered the exclusive domain of the nation-state. As discussed supra,
international human rights treaties include minority protections as
central concerns. 102 Therefore, international human rights law is
frequently deployed to address the problem of minority
underrepresentation—the very concern that is at the heart of Ely’s
theory.
While in theory, international law aims to both address collective
action problems (such as climate change) and protect underrepresented
minorities (such as immigrants), in practice, as discussed further below,
international regulation often mirrors similar market failures reflected
in the United States (and other countries). After all, international law is
a system of states. Thus, not surprisingly, the market failures that are
endemic within the nation-state are often projected to the international
level.
Even so, because the goal of international law is to address such
failures, global governance has the potential to respond—where nationstates acting alone (in an uncoordinated fashion) are not able to—for a
few reasons. First, global governance can address collective action
failures, including where public goods (such as the environment) are at
stake, by getting all countries on board, to move beyond prisoner’s
dilemmas, so long as defections can be detected and addressed. Second,
because everyone is likely a “minority” somewhere in the world (and
behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, we are all potential minorities
somewhere), international law can protect minority interests—at least
conceptually (if not always effectively in terms of enforcement)—where
national governments occasionally fail to (as in the case of genocide or
other extreme governance failures). Finally, while many democraticallyelected leaders participate in the international system—and so there is at
least some degree of democratic accountability—international law is
often criticized as suffering from democratic deficits. However, the fact
that international governance regimes are not directly democratic helps
102

See supra note 42.
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to guard against the various tyrannies of majorities that we are so
familiar with in national politics. This too is a safeguard, particularly as
we consider that contemporary international law largely grew out of
World War II and the extreme abuses of nationalism in Nazi Germany.
F.

Limitations of this Approach

It is important to acknowledge limitations to the approach I am
outlining in this Article. First, while international law can be long on
principle, it is often short on enforcement. 103 Second, while this Article
is somewhat trans-substantive, I am limiting this Article to climate
change and sanctuary policies. Though the ideas I introduce may have
relevance for other federalism disputes involving transnational issues, I
am not, at this juncture, extending my approach beyond the two case
studies analyzed here. 104 Even assuming the ideas discussed in this
Article are limited to these two matters, climate change and
immigration are large enough dilemmas to warrant fresh thinking on
their own.
Third, to the extent that this Article focuses on sub-federal climate
and sanctuary innovations that represent forms of resistance to federal
policy, it is critical to note at the outset the diversity of policies in both
areas, and that many jurisdictions are oriented toward various forms of
cooperation (if only unwittingly) or are engaged in a mix (or
patchwork) of various forms of cooperation and resistance. 105 While by

103

Catharine MacKinnon makes this observation by noting:

Briefly put, the applicable international law was strong in principle but weak on
delivery. Domestic law in many countries had the reverse problem. It was often short
on principle by international standards but long on teeth. We concluded that if you
want a statement of principle, go to an international forum; if you want delivery, go
to a national court.
Catharine A. Mackinnon, Remedies for War Crimes at the National Level, J. INT’L INST., Fall
1988, at 23, https://quod.lib.umich.edu/j/jii/4750978.0006.103/—remedies-for-war-crimes-atthe-national-level?rgn=main;view=fulltext [https://perma.cc/DUX7-RZRJ].
104 As discussed in the Introduction, supra, other federalism debates, such as those involving
the legalization of marijuana and guns policy, have transnational dimensions. However, neither
is inherently transnational in the way climate and immigration policy are.
105 The state of Texas, for example, prohibits sanctuary jurisdictions (under SB4), even while
a number of cities within the state have proclaimed themselves sanctuaries.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3155282

Powell.40.6.6 (Do Not Delete)

2019]

7/15/2019 4:43 PM

WE THE PEOPLE

2715

some measures, the adoption of sub-federal policies resisting aspects of
federal climate and immigration policies has accelerated since the 2016
election, in many (and perhaps in most respects), subnational
jurisdictions continue to cooperate with the federal government. It is
also vital to recognize that the roots of both resistance and cooperation
pre-date the 2016 election and actually go back for years. 106
Lastly, the claims in this Article are not intended to suggest that
jurisdictions engaged in forms of resistance will inevitably win the day
or that progress (in whatever way one defines it) is linear. “[T]he arc of
the moral universe” might “bend[] toward justice,” 107 but the history
suggests that the efforts examined in this Article (to either protect
disadvantaged minorities or curb the influence of influential minorities)
inevitably experience cycles of progress and retrenchment and can never
be taken for granted as settled.
II. CLIMATE CHANGE FEDERALISM
This Part examines how, by shifting from a top-down, centralized
approach to a bottom-up, decentralized governance approach,
environmental governance now has the potential to more effectively
address the problem of regulatory capture both above and below the
nation-state. Other scholars have observed this shift in environmental
governance, but what this Article adds is how the shift to bottom-up fits
into a theory of challenging political market failure. As discussed in Part
I, international law is made by nation-states qua nation-states. Moving
beyond the “black box” theory of the nation-state, we can view the
positions that countries take in negotiating and creating legal standards
on the international stage as reflecting political preferences in domestic

106 For helpful discussion of this history in the climate change context, see Ann E. Carlson,
Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097 (2009). For a valuable
overview of the history of the sanctuary jurisdictions movement, see Annie Lai & Christopher
N. Lasch, Crimmigration Resistance and the Case of Sanctuary City Defunding, 57 SANTA
CLARA L. REV 539, 546–48 (2017) (discussing how sanctuary policies have proceeded in four
successive waves).
107 Matt Lewis, Obama Loves Martin Luther King’s Great Quote—But He Uses It Incorrectly,
DAILY BEAST (Jan. 16, 2017, 12:15 AM), https://www.thedailybeast.com/obama-loves-martinluther-kings-great-quotebut-he-uses-it-incorrectly [https://perma.cc/V6WZ-BA4V].
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politics. 108 Because global environmental governance—like most
international governance—mirrors the preferences of nation-states
(and, in turn, the domestic political interests of those in power in
various countries), historically, global environmental regulation suffered
from similar problems (as domestic policy) of regulatory capture, but at
the global scale. By combining insights from international relations (IR)
and federalism scholars, this Part analyzes how new models of
governance—which challenge the exclusive role of the federal
government in environmental law—can address shortcomings of both
international and national governance.
Despite ample evidence of climate change, the Trump
administration is rolling back federal commitments to mitigate its
effects and has sought to undermine climate research. 109 Research
provides the basis for knowledge and information, and by undermining
support for research, the federal government is affirmatively reinforcing
the problem of information asymmetries. Science denialism appears to
be based on the regulatory capture of the federal government by the coal
industry 110 (and plays into the broader trend toward creating a “posttruth” society).

108 Under a traditional, realist view of international law and international relations, scholars
conceived of the nation-state as an undifferentiated “black box,” rather than look inside the box
to examine how domestic politics impact the positions national governments take
internationally. In this view, countries interact as “billiard balls” on a pool table, knocking up
against each other, rather than influencing and reshaping each other’s preferences and interests.
See Putnam, supra note 29 (recognizing that national-level policymakers face constituencies at
both domestic and international levels and exploring the dynamic interaction between the two
in international negotiations); see also Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Relations, Principal
Theories, in 6 THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 129 (Rüdiger
Wolfrum ed., 2013) (contrasting realist with other theories of international law and
international relations).
109 On efforts to undermine climate change research, see supra note 92. For a summary of
scientific evidence regarding climate change, see infra notes 112–13 and accompanying text.
For a discussion of the federal government’s dramatic reversal on climate policy—with the
transition from President Obama to President Trump, see infra Section II.A.5.
110 As discussed infra in Section I.B, evidence of the political influence of the fossil fuel
companies is apparent from the fact that former lobbyists for coal and other fossil fuel
companies are now in senior positions at the EPA, implementing policies they pushed for while
in the private sector—a dubious practice that raises ethical and legal concerns regarding
restrictions on lobbying.
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Section II.A discusses how global environmental regulation has
shifted from a traditional top-down regulatory approach to a bottom-up
catalytic governance approach 111 and explores how this shift helps
address governance failures at the global level. Section II.B examines
how a similar dynamic is at work with regard to domestic climate
policy. Section II.C extracts the lessons gleaned from global
environmental governance and IR scholarship to clarify further how
sub-federal policy innovation can address the political market failures
that are apparent in climate policy.
Scientific research demonstrates that rising sea levels are increasing
the risk of catastrophic flooding; that shifting weather patterns threaten
food production and even water; and that we are already experiencing
some of the cataclysmic effects of climate change, particularly in coastal
areas. 112 Furthermore, as overdevelopment, population growth, and
climate change upset the balance between water use and supply, urban
centers across the globe—from Cape Town to Los Angeles to Beijing—
increasingly face longer, more frequent, and more unpredictable
droughts and severe drinking-water shortages. 113 The impacts could
challenge the planet’s ability to support life as we know it.
A.

The Shift in Global Environmental Governance at the Global Level

This Section discusses how global environmental governance has
shifted from a traditional top-down regulatory approach to a bottom-up
catalytic governance approach, and explores how this shift helps address
111 I am borrowing the dichotomy between “regulatory” versus “catalytic” approaches from
Thomas E. Hale, Catalytic Institutions for the Global Commons: Tragedy or Tipping Point?,
FUTURE GLOBAL ORDER COLLOQUIUM (2017), https://global.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/
halepaper.original.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SGF-JG4R].
112 Climate Change, UNITED NATIONS: GLOBAL ISSUES, http://www.un.org/en/sections/
issues-depth/climate-change [https://perma.cc/L68W-9ALL] (last visited May 24, 2019); Hale,
supra note 111, at 17.
113 Nita Bhalla, World Has Not Woken Up to Water Crisis Caused by Climate Change, SCI.
AM. (Feb. 3, 2015), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/world-has-not-woken-up-towater-crisis-caused-by-climate-change [https://perma.cc/9LQB-A8NL]; Scott Moore, On ‘Day
Zero,’ Cape Town Will Run Out of Water. It’s Not the Only City at Risk, WASH. POST (Feb. 5,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/02/05/on-day-zero-capetown-will-run-out-of-water-other-cities-are-in-the-same-boat/?utm_term=.084bfc874587
[https://perma.cc/VFL8-WZN4].
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political market failures in global governance. Subsection II.A.1
provides an overview of the mechanics and importance of this shift.
Subsection II.A.2 describes the governance shortcomings of the
traditional top-down regulatory approach. Subsection II.A.3 examines
the transition from the traditional to the bottom-up governance
approach. Subsection II.A.4 reflects on how the 2015 Paris climate
change agreement marked the full emergence of a bottom-up catalytic
governance approach. Subsection II.A.5 discusses the commitments
then-President Obama made under the Paris accord, as well as steps
President Trump has taken to pull back from these commitments.
1.

The Need for Reform and Overview of the Shift

The largely ineffective ability of traditional international law to
address a range of environmental challenges paved the way for new
models of global environmental governance. 114 As Eric Orts notes,
“[g]lobal environmental governance refers to the institutional and
individual capacities that affect how human interactions contribute to
either causing or alleviating environmental problems, including various
kinds of pollution.” 115 Many environmental law scholars note that
climate change is a global environmental problem requiring not only
strategies of mitigation, but also strategies of adaptation and
resilience. 116
114 See Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence of Global Environmental Law, 36
ECOLOGY L.Q. 615 (2009).
115 Eric W. Orts, The Reformation of Global Environmental Governance: Addressing the
Challenge of Climate Change, FUTURE GLOBAL ORDER COLLOQUIUM 2 (2017), https://
global.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/go-reformation-of-global-orts.original.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/6JVK-MMC3].
116 See, e.g., Engel, supra note 19, at 75–76.

[A]daptation is usually understood as the minimization of harms resulting from
climate change that will occur despite whatever mitigation measures are being taken.
In view of this, many believe the objective of adaptation should be resilience . . . the
“capacity of an ecosystem to withstand disturbance and maintain the same basic
processes and structures” or “the ability of a system to return to its initial state and
function in spite of some major perturbation.” Commentators generally agree that
regulatory approaches should seek to reduce the vulnerability of ecosystems to
abrupt and uncertain change and to reinforce the resiliency of such systems so that
they survive the onslaught of climatic changes.
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A more traditional international environmental law approach
focused on top-down implementation by the nation-state—and
international agreements among nation-states. By contrast, the new
global environmental governance approach transcends this and moves
toward a bottom-up approach to account for roles played by not only
national governments, but also other organizations, including
subnational governments, corporate firms, non-governmental
organizations, and international organizations. 117
The road from the 1992 Rio Earth Summit to the 2015 Paris
Agreement illustrates a shift from the more traditional, top-down,
“regulatory” approach to a more polycentric, bottom-up, “catalytic”
approach. 118 While different scholars describe this shift in various ways,
I am drawn to the regulatory/catalytic dichotomy utilized by IR scholar
Thomas Hale. 119 This fits within the shift Professor Orts discusses (from
traditional international environmental law to global environmental
governance) and the dynamics that Sabel and Victor discuss, 120 but goes
further by providing a deeper conceptual basis for understanding why
the shift in approach has been beneficial in realizing the climate change
mitigation goals and addressing shortcomings in global regulation,
where past efforts failed.
By “regulatory institutional approach,” Hale refers to top-down
“collective agreement[s] [among national governments] to proscribe [at
the global level] what each country is allowed to do and aims to detect
and punish non-compliance.” 121 In theorizing the notion of a catalytic,
bottom-up approach, Hale explains that the problem structure of global
climate mitigation can be understood not only as a tragedy of the
commons, but also more precisely as a tipping problem. 122 After all, the
chief barrier to cooperation is not necessarily the threat of free-riding,
but the lack of incentive to act in the first place. States and other actors
Id.
117 Orts, supra note 115, at 2. See also Charles F. Sabel & David G. Victor, Governing Global
Problems Under Uncertainty: Making Bottom-Up Climate Policy Work, 144 CLIMATIC CHANGE
15 (2017).
118 Orts, supra note 115, at 1–2; Hale, supra note 111, at 4–10.
119 Hale, supra note 111.
120 See Orts, supra note 115, at 1–2; Sabel & Victor, supra note 117.
121 Hale, supra note 111, at 5.
122 Id. at 1.
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seek to solve this problem by creating “catalytic institutions,” which
“shift actors’ preferences and strategies toward cooperative outcomes over
time.” 123
In fact, the bottom-up and polycentric nature of such initiatives is
essential to this catalytic approach and its ability to enhance compliance
with international law norms concerning climate change. Here, it is
useful to draw, by analogy, to Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel’s notion
of “directly deliberative polyarchy” in their classic work on democratic
experimentalism, wherein jurisdictions are encouraged to take
ownership, benchmark progress against particular goals, experiment,
use transparency to encourage participation, and make improvements
over time in learning-by-doing. 124 In this vein, scholars have noted the
emergence of sub-federal governments (along with businesses, nongovernmental organizations, and other non-state actors) that are
engaged in climate change policy in a directly deliberative way and, as
Nobel political economist Elinor Ostrom noted, in a polycentric
mode 125—and, I would add, in an increasingly networked mode. In
addition to an emergence of multiple, overlapping climate regimes—or
“regime complexes” 126—there is a rise of multiple actors and venues for
deliberation. As Hale notes:
Indeed, there has been such a proliferation and pluralisation of
climate governance . . . in which governance and action occur in

123 Id. (emphasis added to underscore the dynamic of catalyst, which means not only to
trigger, but also to increase the rate over time).
124 Dorf & Sabel, supra note 33, at 288 (“The system in which citizens in each locale
participate directly in determining and assessing the utility of the services local government
provides, given the possibility of comparing the performance of their jurisdiction to the
performance of similar settings, we will call directly deliberative polyarchy.”). Dorf and Sabel
further note: “This term and the ideas associated with it are developed in the eponymous
companion piece by Joshua Cohen [and] Charles Sabel.” Id. at 315 n.118 (citing Joshua Cohen
& Charles Sabel, Directly Deliberative Polyarchy, 3 EUR. L.J. 313 (1997). See also ROBERT A.
DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 221–22 (1989).
125 See Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change, 15 ANNALS
ECON. & FIN. 97 (2014), http://aeconf.com/articles/may2014/aef150103.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YSF4-B7N8].
126 Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change, 9
PERSP. ON POL. 7 (2011), https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/
article/the-regime-complex-for-climate-change/F5C4F620A4723D5DA5E0ACDC48D860C0
[https://perma.cc/N2FH-KEGC].
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myriad ways through many different coalitions that range in scale
from global to local . . . . Polycentrism argues that “climate change”
encompasses many interlocking sub-issues that manifest differently
across contexts. 127

To understand the broader context in which state and local climate
change initiatives arise in the United States, it is useful to trace the
shortcomings of the traditional, top-down, “regulatory” approach,
before turning to the transition to the more decentralized, bottom-up,
“catalytic” approach.
2.

The Traditional Regulatory Approach: From Rio to Kyoto

At the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, countries adopted the U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC or Framework
Convention), 128 reflecting a traditional regulatory approach to
international governance. The UNFCCC was aimed at preventing
“dangerous” human interference with the Earth’s climate, caused by the
emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases (GHGs). 129 The
Rio process followed the “convention + protocol” template, which
characterizes not only global environmental governance, but also other
areas of international law, in which “countries agree [upon] a
framework convention to identify a problem and create a negotiating
process through which member states then work to agree [on] a series of
protocols that collectively bind them to specific commitments.” 130 Hale
refers to this as a “regulatory” approach, since it seeks top-down
agreement among national governments to define standards. 131
Following the 1992 Rio Summit’s adoption of the Framework
Convention, countries eventually agreed to devise a protocol, resulting
in the 1997 Kyoto Protocol. 132 The Kyoto Protocol required wealthy
Hale, supra note 111, at 7–8.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S.
107 (from Rio Earth Summit Conference).
129 Id. pmbl., ¶ 2; id. art. 2.
130 Hale, supra note 111, at 4–5.
131 Id. at 5.
132 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec.
11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162.
127
128
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countries to reduce emissions and created an emissions trading system
as well as other forms of flexibility to permit wealthy nations the option
of reducing emissions in poorer countries as a way of claiming
reductions against their own targets. 133 However, once George W. Bush
became president, the United States retreated from the Kyoto Protocol
in 2001 and, in any event, it was “soon outpaced by the rapid
industrialization of emerging economies.” 134
Noting the governance shortcomings of Kyoto, Professor Orts
contends, “the Kyoto style of organizing nation-states to address climate
change by a treaty or other formal ‘top-down’ arrangement foundered”
for a couple of reasons, 135 which he mainly relates to the tragedy of the
commons and free rider problems that Garrett Hardin famously
identified. 136 First, the Kyoto approach involved disagreement about
how to conceive of both the nature of the problem and how to most
fairly and effectively design the solutions, given several factors. The
complexity of many nations with conflicting interests and values led to
competing economic interests and controversy over the “ethics of
comparative responsibility” among countries (for example, about how
much the largely rich countries who had historically gained from
industrial and other policies adverse to the climate should compensate
those largely poorer countries who had not benefited). 137
133 For a more detailed explanation of how emissions trading in particular works, see
Emissions Trading: The Carbon “Market”, UNFCCC, https://web.archive.org/web/
20070106223133/http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/background/items/2880.php (last visited
Apr. 13, 2019):

Nations that have contributed the most to global warming have tended to benefit
directly in terms of greater business profits and higher standards of living [and yet]
[t]he negative effects of climate change will be felt all over the world, and actually the
consequences are expected to be most severe in least-developed nations which have
produced few emissions.
Id. The largely more industrialized nations will get credit for reducing greenhouse-gas totals in
a number of ways, including for projects they support under the Protocol’s Clean Development
Mechanism, which can fund activities to reduce emissions by developing nations. “Credits
earned this way may be bought and sold in the emissions market or ‘banked’ for future use.” Id.
134 Hale, supra note 111, at 2.
135 Orts, supra note 115, at 1.
136 Id.; Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
137 Orts, supra note 115, at 1; see also Hale, supra note 111, at 5 (observing that related to
these fundamental disagreements between rich and poor nations, the United States and China
in particular quarreled over who bore responsibility).
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Second, solutions needed to be conceived of in a way that accounts
for variation across both space and time. After all, “[s]ome countries are
[] more vulnerable to climate risks than others.” 138 Plus, “the short
attention spans of most human beings do not easily engage rationally
with long-term climate consequences.” 139 Finally, not only are
mechanisms for monitoring and enforcing global standards for GHGs
weak, but it is also challenging to determine how international
regulation can best address “the economic phenomenon of ‘leakage’—
i.e., the displacement of climate unfriendly production to non-regulated
jurisdictions.” 140
Following Kyoto—and even before the political emergence of
Trump,
[W]e have seen slow progress, and even reversals of progress in
countries such as the United States, because of general scientific
ignorance, a cultural divide between scientist and policymakers, the
politicization of science (and the advent of “alternative facts”), the
organized denial of science, and partisan politics driven by business
interests that would be affected negatively by climate mitigation
policies. 141

3.

The Transition from the Regulatory to Catalytic Approach

Given these governance shortcomings—and in light of the
“faltering regulatory approach,” two alternatives emerged during the
transition from Kyoto to the Paris Agreement: a “club” approach and a
“polycentric” approach. 142

Orts, supra note 115, at 1.
Id.
140 Id. For a fuller treatment of these points, see Eric W. Orts, Climate Contracts, 29 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 197 (2011).
141 Orts, supra note 115, at 2 (citing DALE JAMIESON, REASON IN A DARK TIME: WHY THE
STRUGGLE AGAINST CLIMATE CHANGE FAILED—AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR OUR FUTURE 61–
104 (2014) for discussion of these and other challenges written prior to the most recent
obstacles to addressing climate change illustrated by the Trump campaign and his
administration).
142 Hale, supra note 111, at 6–8.
138
139
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The Club Approach: The club approach built on the insight that
while it is challenging to negotiate among over 190 nation-states, only a
few dozen countries actually “mattered” for emissions purposes, and
that limited membership institutions—like trade agreements—would
have a better chance of securing cooperation, especially if such clubs
could provide benefits for members that would then incentivize states to
join. 143 However, while this approach was attractive in theory, “in
practice[,] climate clubs have struggled to identify excludable benefits
because the atmosphere is inherently non-excludable.” 144
The Polycentric Approach: The polycentric approach took
advantage of the emergence of transnational networks of sub-state and
non-state actors, including cities, businesses, environmental groups, and
activists. As Hale observes:
[Polycentrism] may still be a tragedy of the commons at the global
scale, but many actors[] will engage with specific aspects of the
problem at different scales, such as a city focused on transport, a
farming community focused on preserving their crops from drought,
or a consortium of corporations seeking to preserve the sustainability
of their supply chains. 145

Envisioning information exchange across these various sites of
governance operating in a polycentric mode, Professor Ostrom urged
“methods for assessing the benefits and costs of particular strategies
adopted in one type of ecosystem and [comparing these with] results
obtained in other ecosystems.” 146 The problem with polycentric
structures, however, is that while they can “drive cooperation at

Id. at 6.
Id. Hale notes proposals to link climate and trade, such as proposed carbon tariffs that
would penalize laggards—the excludable benefit being avoiding the tariffs. However,
143
144

[t]he most serious attempt to impose a carbon tariff of this nature was the EU’s
modest proposal to require airlines using European airspace to pay a small carbon
tax. [T]he proposal . . . was vigorously opposed by the United States, China, and
India, and eventually scrapped by European member states that did not want to pay
the costs of friction with significant trading partners.
Id.
145
146

Id. at 8.
Ostrom, supra note 125.
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multiple scales for those actors who wish to address [climate change,
they] offer few solutions to compel recalcitrant actors.” 147
4.

The Catalytic Approach: Paris Agreement and Beyond

When President George W. Bush “unsigned” the Kyoto Protocol,148
economist Thomas Schelling published a notable article in Foreign
Affairs contending that Kyoto’s regulatory regime was not workable,
and calling for an approach based on iterative and flexible
commitments. 149 In fact, the failure of the traditional regulatory
approach did not lead climate change mitigation efforts to simply
stagnate. Instead, “policy entrepreneurs radically changed the logic” 150
of these efforts.
As Professor Orts flatly observes, “Kyoto is dead, and Paris has
killed it.” 151 While Kyoto involved a set of shared reduction targets
through formal international legal agreements negotiated by nations,
the Paris Agreement involved a conceptual shift. The 2015 Paris accord
requires each nation to come forward with its own pledge, or “nationally
determined contribution.” These national pledges are then reviewed at
the international level and ratcheted up on a periodic five-year basis.
The goal is ambitious—to prevent no more GHGs entering the
atmosphere than are absorbed—in effect, creating a decarbonized world
by the second half of the century. To help facilitate the process, Paris
provides a key role for sub-state and non-state actors, “creating

Hale, supra note 111, at 8.
Note that the 1997 Kyoto Protocol was brokered by then-Vice President Al Gore and
signed by then-President Bill Clinton. Similarly, President Trump’s announcement that he
intends to withdraw from Paris (or negotiate a better deal) follows President Obama’s personal
leadership role in clinching the Paris deal. Riley Beggin, The Last Time a US President Dumped
a Global Climate Deal, ABC NEWS (June 1, 2017, 4:42 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/
time-us-president-dumped-global-climate-deal/story?id=47771005
[https://perma.cc/9FJBLJ6X].
149 Thomas C. Schelling, What Makes Greenhouse Sense?, FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2002, at
2 (2002), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2002-05-01/what-makes-greenhouse-sense
[https://perma.cc/H3P9-XJSP].
150 Hale, supra note 111, at 2.
151 Orts, supra note 115, at 1.
147
148
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institutions to recognize and orchestrate their climate action alongside
the national pledges.” 152
In fact, early on during negotiations leading up to the Paris accord,
the Obama administration rejected the more traditional, top-down
approach—where treaty terms would have provided what was expected
of states-parties. Partly, the Obama team thought reaching global
consensus on such treaty terms would be nearly impossible. Plus,
getting a treaty with legally binding commitments through the Senate
did not seem entirely feasible politically, particularly where “most
Republican Senators did not even [publicly] acknowledge the existence
of the underlying problem of climate change.” 153
At the same time, President Obama was ultimately committed to
seeing the Paris process succeed. He noted that the two largest
existential threats to humans and global civilizations are the potential
threat of thermonuclear war (which remains in the realm of traditional
statecraft by governments to manage) and climate change (which
nation-states alone will not be able to address). 154
The only non-signatories of the Paris Agreement—Syria and
Nicaragua—eventually signed it. With Trump’s announcement that he
intends to pull the United States out of the agreement, “it would be the
only country in the world outside the agreement.” 155
The 2018 U.N. Climate Change Conference in Poland—climate
talks marking the third anniversary of the Paris accord—reaffirmed
Paris, taking steps toward “putting the 2015 Paris agreement into
practice” by addressing issues such as “how governments will measure,
report on and verify their emissions-cutting efforts,” while still leaving it

Hale, supra note 111, at 2 (providing overview of main elements of the Paris accord).
Ann Carlson, Climate Change, Trump and Populism, FUTURE GLOBAL ORDER
COLLOQUIUM 2
(2017),
https://global.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/go-climate-changecarlson.original.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2B5-T5VQ].
154 Orts, supra note 115, at 1. Orts cites Thomas L. Friedman, ‘Trump’s Folly’, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 13, 2017, at A27, stating “off-the-record interview with a person familiar with President
Obama’s daily briefings in the Oval Office” and “describing the risks of nuclear war such as
with North Korea and the risks of global climate change suggested by Hurricanes Harvey and
Irma as two leading national security threats.” Id. at 1 n.1.
155 Alexandra Simon-Lewis, What Is the Paris Climate Agreement and Who Has Signed It?,
WIRED (Nov. 7, 2017), http://www.wired.co.uk/article/what-is-paris-agreement-on-climatechange [https://perma.cc/UNZ7-KRRY].
152
153
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to states in 2020 to choose their own new, tougher targets. 156 The United
States agreed to the deal in Poland, despite Trump’s vow to abandon the
Paris accord, prompting diplomats and climate change activists to hope
that the administration may “change its mind and stay in the Paris
Agreement, or for a future president to embrace the accord once
again.” 157
5.

U.S. Paris Commitments and Trump’s Threatened Withdrawal

While the new governance approach ushered in by the Paris
climate change agreement has garnered participation by every single
country in the world—including meaningful participation by the
world’s largest economies—President Trump signaled his intention to
withdraw from the accord. To understand what he may be walking away
from, this Subsection provides a brief overview of the primary elements
of the United States’ pledges pursuant to the agreement. In its nationally
determined commitment (NDC), the United States pledged to reduce
emissions by 26% to 28% below 2005 levels by 2025. This pledge
includes five main components, each of which is under threat by the
Trump administration, court action, or both: 158
The Clean Power Plan: The Clean Power Plan was Obama’s
signature commitment under the Paris Agreement. The Plan involved
cutting emissions from power plants by 32% by 2030. While the power
sector is the second largest source of greenhouse gases in the country—
behind transportation—the cuts in power plant emissions would be
greater than from the transportation sector, making the commitment
outsized in importance. In August 2018, Trump’s EPA “proposed
replacing the [Clean Power Plan’s] rule on carbon dioxide pollution
from coal-fired power plants with a weaker one that would allow far
156 Fiona Harvey, What Was Agreed at COP24 in Poland and Why Did It Take So Long?,
GUARDIAN (Dec. 16, 2018, 7:04 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/dec/16/
what-was-agreed-at-cop24-in-poland-and-why-did-it-take-so-long
[https://perma.cc/R4RCPELH].
157 Brad Plumer, Climate Negotiators Reach an Overtime Deal to Keep Paris Pact Alive, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/15/climate/cop24-katowice-climatesummit.html [https://perma.cc/JS2L-T2BQ].
158 This summary draws on (and updates) a summary outlined in Carlson, supra note 153, at
2–3.
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more global-warming emissions to flow unchecked from the nation’s
smokestacks.” 159
Higher Fuel Economy Standards: The second most significant
commitment is the pledge to strengthen fuel efficiency standards in cars
and trucks. In August 2018, the Trump administration unveiled its plan
to relax auto emission restrictions, weakening Obama-era regulations to
curb pollution by requiring increased fuel-efficiency standards for
cars. 160
The proposed new rules would also challenge the right of states, in
particular California, which, under waivers from the federal
government, had been able to set its own, more stringent tailpipe
pollution standards. Given the problem of automobile pollution in
California, the commitment to reducing car emissions in the state has
been bipartisan. In 1967, then-California State “Governor Ronald
Reagan signed legislation creating the powerful California Air Resources
Board to regulate air pollution statewide, including by strictly curbing
vehicle emissions.” 161 The Trump administration proposal would revoke
the California waiver, granted under the 1970 Clean Air Act—and
followed by a dozen states and the District of Columbia—which allows
states to set pollution standards that are more stringent than the federal
government’s standards. 162 The plan to revoke the waiver sets the stage
for a legal conflict that could split the nation’s auto market in two—
“[o]ne for California and the dozen other aligned states that account for
one-third of the U.S. auto market, and another for the rest of the
country”163—a situation that auto companies themselves have said they
159 Id.; Davenport, supra note 80; see also Lipton, Dirtiest Coal, supra note 80; Friedman,
supra note 91; What Is the Clean Power Plan, and How Can Trump Repeal It?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/10/climate/epa-clean-power-plan.html [https://
perma.cc/6XXM-D38B].
160 Davenport, supra note 91.
161 Jody Freeman, Trump’s Biggest Climate Move Yet Is Bad for Everyone, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/02/opinion/trumps-biggest-climate-move-yet-isbad-for-everyone.html?action=click&module=RelatedCoverage&pgtype=Article&
region=Footer [https://perma.cc/J3VW-HES4].
162 Tony Barboza, California Counters Trump on Car Emissions Standards, Expands Other
Climate Rules, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018, 4:55 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/lame-carbon-fuels-20180928-story.html [https://perma.cc/2FMM-7Y55].
163 Id.; Miranda Green, California Sues Trump Administration for Details on Car Emissions
Rollback Decision, HILL (Apr. 8, 2019, 12:06 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-
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want to avoid. 164 Following a breakdown in negotiations between
California and the federal government in February 2019, California sued
the Trump administration for details behind the administration’s
decision to lower auto emissions. 165
Stricter Appliance Efficiency Standards: The Obama administration
issued more stringent efficiency standards for twenty-nine different
categories of equipment and appliances, such as air conditioners and
compressors, in order to reduce energy consumption. By refusing to
allow agencies to submit the regulations for publication in the Federal
Register, the Trump administration has, in effect, frozen the
implementation of these standards. 166
Reductions in Methane from Landfills and Oil and Gas Operations:
The Obama administration adopted new regulations, one to reduce
methane from landfills, as well as others to reduce emissions from oil
and gas operations on public lands. 167 Along with carbon dioxide,
methane is a “potent greenhouse gas . . . considered a primary driver of
global warming.” 168 The Obama-era rule, which was never permitted to
go into effect once Trump came to office, “would have required oil and
gas companies to capture leaked methane, repair outdated leakdetection equipment and come up with new plans to reduce waste.” 169
environment/437839-california-sues-trump-admin-for-details-on-car-emissions-rollback
[https://perma.cc/J8JE-VDPV] (“Thirteen states follow California’s standards for cars sold in
their borders, representing about 40 percent of the nation’s vehicle market.”).
164 The Trump administration “proposal goes much further than many major automakers
wanted, and manufacturers are now worried that years of legal challenges and regulatory
uncertainty could complicate their business.” Davenport, supra note 91.
165 Green, supra note 163; see also Ryan Beene, White House Warns Carmakers on Emissions
in Tense Call, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 6, 2019, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2019-03-06/white-house-to-automakers-it-s-trump-or-california-on-emissions (“The White
House has issued an us-versus-them challenge to carmakers: back an administration plan to roll
back fuel-economy standards or risk President Donald Trump’s wrath by siding with
California’s stringent emissions requirements.”).
166 Carlson, supra note 153, at 2.
167 Id.
168 Lisa Friedman, Trump Administration Formally Rolls Back Rule Aimed at Limiting
Methane Pollution, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/18/climate/
trump-methane-rollback.html [https://perma.cc/3ZCB-HGGB].
169 Id. (explaining that “[h]ad it been finalized, it would have cut methane from the oil and
gas sector by as much as 35 percent and helped the United States to achieve its greenhouse gas
emissions goal under the global Paris Agreement on climate change.”).
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However, in September 2018, the Trump administration reversed the
Obama-era regulation “that would have reduced leaking, venting and
flaring of methane from drilling activity on federal and tribal land.”170
The Trump administration’s approach makes it significantly easier for
energy companies to release methane into the atmosphere, and “energy
companies have long said that the rules requiring them to test for
emissions were costly and burdensome.” 171
Reductions in High Global Warming Potential Hydrofluorocarbon:
Initially, the Trump administration appeared to support an Obama-era
rule requiring the phase-out of certain uses of hydrofluorocarbons
(HFCs)—a particularly potent GHG used in air-conditioners and
refrigerators. Honeywell and DuPont Chemical’s spinoff, Chemours
Company, supported the rule, which Professor Ann Carlson notes may
help explain the Trump administration’s support for the rule. 172 The fact
that the Trump administration seemed inclined to maintain this last
pledge made by Obama (which chemical companies actually
supported)—but not the other four commitments Obama made toward
the Paris accord—underscores the points I make above in Part I about
regulatory capture. However, in the aftermath of a D.C. Circuit ruling
holding that the EPA exceeded its authority in issuing the rule, 173 the
Trump administration proposed a new rule rescinding even this
Obama-era regulation. 174

Id.
Davenport, supra note 80.
172 Carlson, supra note 153, at 2 (noting, however, that the D.C. Circuit “recently struck
down the rule on the grounds that EPA lacked the authority to issue it under the Clean Air
Act.”).
173 Mexichem Fluor, Inc. v. EPA, 866 F.3d 451 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
174 Miranda Green, EPA to Abandon Restrictions Against Chemical Linked to Climate
Change, HILL (Sept. 20, 2018, 12:38 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/
407614-epa-to-abandon-restrictions-against-climate-change-linked-chemical
[https://
perma.cc/A9L6-U959]. For more detail, see Russ LaMotte et al., EPA Proposes Rescinding
Certain HFC Rules for Refrigeration and Air-Conditioning Appliances, BEVERIDGE & DIAMOND
PC (Sept. 27, 2018), https://www.bdlaw.com/publications/epa-proposes-rescinding-certain-hfcrules-for-refrigeration-and-air-conditioning-appliances [https://perma.cc/7SCP-VCQL].
170
171
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“We the People” and Climate Change at the Domestic Level

This Section examines how a somewhat similar bottom-up,
catalytic approach has unfolded in domestic climate policy. State and
local governments in the United States have a long history of
involvement in addressing climate change and in spurring the federal
government to act—a dynamic that Professor Carlson has called
“iterative federalism.” 175 As discussed below, what is new since President
Trump’s announcement to withdraw from the Paris Agreement is the
ways in which state and local officials have stepped forward to directly
engage global environmental governance in a visible, coordinated, and
networked fashion. By attending international meetings of state parties
to the Paris Agreement—and through their actions and statements at
home—state and local government officials have pledged to fight for the
commitments the United States has made through the Paris process, in
the absence of federal leadership (and more to the point, in the presence
of federal hostility).
In so doing, these state and local government officials are
embracing a shared community (at least concerning our shared planet
and climate) that is both local and global—and that concerns “We the
People” today and “We the People” tomorrow (future generations).
These leaders are forcefully rebutting the efforts of powerful economic
interests to externalize their responsibility for the costs of climate
change to the rest of us—both at home and abroad, for today’s and
future generations. 176 The rest of us do not benefit from these economic
interests but bear the brunt of the cost of climate change. While state
and local officials have grounded their primary concerns in their unique
local environmental priorities, these leaders have also linked these very
concrete local concerns to the global (indeed planetary) phenomenon of
climate change and the recognition that we are all in this together (in a
quite existential way) and depend on cooperation with each other—for
ourselves and future generations. 177

Carlson, supra note 106.
As discussed above, the failure to address climate change today externalizes its effects to
future generations. See discussion supra note 83 and accompanying text.
177 See discussion infra Section II.C.
175
176
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States and Localities to Trump: “Get Out of the Way”

After Trump announced his intention to pull out of the Paris
Agreement, the White House sent a small delegation in December 2017
to U.N. climate talks in Bonn, Germany—a meeting marking the second
anniversary of the Paris accord. 178 While the official U.S. delegation
scheduled a meeting to discuss the future of coal, a high-level bipartisan,
alternative coalition—including former New York City Mayor Michael
Bloomberg, California Governor Jerry Brown, and several senators,
mayors, and business leaders—launched the “America Pledge” report.179
Demanding a “seat at the table” in Bonn, Bloomberg—who is also a
U.N. Special Envoy for Cities and Climate Change—said of the America
Pledge group, “[i]f this group were a country, we’d be the third-biggest
economy in the world.” 180 He went on to say, “[i]f Washington won’t
lead, then mayors and governors will.” 181
California Governor Jerry Brown called on President Trump to
start fighting climate change or to “get out of the way.” 182 Citing recent
violent wildfires in California as an example of extreme weather made
worse by human-made climate change, Brown noted that “the fires are
burning in California [and] [t]hey’ll be burning in France, burning all
around the world,” if countries fail to reduce emissions. 183
Former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry attended the Bonn
meeting as well, to reassure other countries at the summit that
Americans are committed to fighting global warming. Noting that
thirty-eight states have legislation supporting renewable energy, and

178 In fact, “rather than sending high-level Cabinet secretaries to the meeting as the Obama
White House did, the U.S. delegation [was led] by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Thomas A. Shannon, Jr.” Irfan, supra note 71.
179 Watts, supra note 3.
180 Id.
181 Id. For an analysis of other ways that state and local governments have played a role in
advancing international environmental and other policy goals, see, for example, BENJAMIN R.
BARBER, IF MAYORS RULED THE WORLD: DYSFUNCTIONAL NATIONS, RISING CITIES (2013);
William Boyd, Climate Change, Fragmentation, and the Challenges of Global Environmental
Law: Elements of a Post-Copenhagen Assemblage, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 457 (2010).
182 Brown to Trump, supra note 2.
183 Id.
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that ninety major American cities back the Paris accord, Kerry added,
“[w]e’re going to stay on track.”184
A group of 225 investment funds managing more than $26 trillion
in assets announced they were going to put pressure on companies to
reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and disclose climate-related
financial information. 185 The coalition, called the Climate Action 100+
group, includes the California Public Employees’ Retirement System,
the largest U.S. public pension fund. 186 The group says it will focus on
100 of the world’s largest corporate GHG emitters. 187 Anne Simpson,
investment director of sustainability at CalPERS, observed that getting
major energy and transportation companies to align their future plans
with the goals of the Paris Agreement could trigger action across all
sectors as firms will seek to avoid being “left behind” by investors. 188
Moreover, in another bipartisan initiative led by Chicago Mayor
Rahm Emmanuel (and supported by former New York City mayor
Michael Bloomberg and former President Barack Obama), more than
fifty mayors from across the United States and Canada participated in
the North American Climate Summit in Chicago in December 2017.
The group of mayors signed “an official agreement—the Chicago
Climate Charter—in which they pledged to meet the emissionsreduction goals set out by the Paris agreement.” 189 The Chicago Climate
Charter builds on a pledge that Michael Bloomberg had made the year
before that cities and businesses would lead on climate change, with or
Id.
Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. A similar initiative has been launched by New York City Comptroller, Scott Stringer.
See Press Release, Scott M. Stringer, New York City Comptroller, Global Investors Launch
Initiative to Wipe Out Carbon Pollution at Country’s Largest Power Utilities (Feb. 28, 2019),
https://comptroller.nyc.gov/newsroom/global-investors-launch-initiative-to-wipe-out-carbonpollution-at-countrys-largest-power-utilities [https://perma.cc/4Y8Z-78XU] (“As the push to
decarbonize the U.S. economy accelerates, today New York City Comptroller Scott M. Stringer
led a coalition of institutional investors representing some $1.8 trillion in combined assets to
demand the 20 largest publicly traded electricity generators in the U.S. commit to achieving
net-zero carbon emissions.”).
189 Jeremy Berke, More Than 50 US Mayors Just Signed a Charter to Meet the Paris
Agreement Goals Without Trump, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 12, 2017, 1:00 PM), http://www.business
insider.com/paris-agreement-2-year-anniversary-us-mayors-step-up-2017-12
[https://
perma.cc/UX8L-8ECE].
184
185
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without the federal government’s support. A group chaired by
Bloomberg—the Global Covenant of Mayors—was partly responsible
for organizing the Chicago event. 190
In September 2018, California Governor Brown hosted his own
domestic climate change conference in San Francisco, featuring
representatives of sub-national governments, businesses, investors,
musicians, and others to highlight action that could “spur deeper
commitment” from national governments to fight global warming. 191
Along with governors from New York, Maryland and Connecticut,
Governor Brown’s team said they would work on new regulations to
restrict hydrofluorocarbons. 192
Of course, “businesses would prefer a single federal standard, [but]
even a few states acting together could create a significant market for
cleaner alternatives to HFCs,” according to the general counsel for one
industry group, the Air-Conditioning, Heating, and Refrigeration
Institute. 193 A coalition of sixteen states, Puerto Rico, hundreds of cities,
and almost 2,000 businesses, have pledged to ensure that the United
States will meet former President Obama’s Paris pledge to cut GHG
emissions 26% to 28% below 2005 levels by 2025. 194 However, the group
has acknowledged that “United States emissions are on track to fall only
about 17 percent over that span” and that these “states and cities would
have to pursue ambitious new policies, like retrofitting hundreds of
buildings to make them more energy efficient and plugging methane
emissions from landfills, to get closer to the target,” and persuade
“several other states beyond the blue coastal enclaves to join them.” 195
Action by a handful of localities alone will simply not be enough if
we are to rescue the planet. Outlining the sheer scale of the challenge
Id.
Mythili Sampathkumar, California Launches New Climate Change Conference to Help
Fulfill Paris Agreement Targets, INDEPENDENT (July 6, 2017, 11:17 PM), http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/world-0/us-politics/california-climate-change-conference-parisagreement-deal-targets-a7828076.html [https://perma.cc/DG5T-BJB2].
192 Brad Plumer, California Had Its Own Climate Summit. Now What?, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/15/climate/california-climate-summit.html (noting
“[i]n 2016, nations agreed on a treaty to phase out these gases, but Mr. Trump has not
submitted the pact for ratification or written federal regulations.”).
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
190
191
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and the steps necessary to keep global warming below two degrees
Celsius, the internationally agreed-upon goal, a group of researchers
issued a report road map. 196 This would entail “a rapid transformation
of the world’s energy system (measures such as banning the sales of
gasoline vehicles in many cities within a decade) that went far beyond
many of the proposals made in [the] California [September 2018
meeting].” 197
Even so, California Governor Brown has met with China’s chief
climate negotiator and “announced plans for California and China to
work together on zero-emissions vehicles and fuel-cell research[,]” and
“several blue-state governors met behind closed doors with the
environment ministers of Canada and Mexico to forge new partnerships
on issues like electric vehicles and curbing emissions of methane.” 198
While it is unusual for American governors to, in effect, take the lead on
international climate diplomacy, Canada’s minister of environment and
climate change notes, “It is important to show the world that we’re still
working with U.S. states,” and that “[t]here really are practical things we
can do together.” 199
2.

Iterative Federalism and Climate Change

While the potential for federal action in support of climate change
mitigation appears slim in the near-term, state and local governments
(as well as regional alliances of states) have a long history of
involvement in addressing climate change and in catalyzing the federal
government to act—through the dynamic of “iterative federalism.”200 By
incentivizing other levels of government to act, “iterative federalism”
can act as a mechanism for tipping norms and addressing the market
failures. However, what is worrisome in the present moment is whether
federalism doctrines, such as preemption, might be used to prevent
subnational governments from playing a leadership role in climate
change. This Subsection examines two examples of subnational
196
197
198
199
200

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Carlson, supra note 106.
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participation—indeed leadership—in climate change mitigation as a
way of illustrating the power of iterative federalism. This illustration
also serves as a warning of what may be lost if the federal government
fails to act, or worse, preempts subnational climate change policy, by,
for example, withdrawing the California waiver on auto emissions.
The California example, in particular, also serves to illustrate the
point made by Professor Hale in the global context about how climate
change is not only a tragedy of the commons but also a tipping problem.
As noted above, in tipping problems, the primary obstacle to
cooperation is less the threat of free-riding than the absence of incentive
to act in the first place. 201 My discussion here will adapt Hale’s theory
and apply it to the domestic context in considering federalism and
environmental law through the two brief examples outlined in this
Subsection.
As these examples demonstrate, the most productive approaches to
environmental regulation domestically have involved cooperative
federalism. As Professor Carlson notes:
[A]ccounts of state involvement on climate change [that]
emphasiz[e] how the states have partly filled the regulatory voids
created by federal inaction [] misses the important—indeed critical—
backdrop of the federal government and federal law. The most
innovative state responses to climate change are neither the product
of state regulation alone nor are they exclusively the result of federal
action. Instead, such regulations are the results of repeated,
sustained, and dynamic lawmaking efforts involving both levels of
government—what I term “iterative federalism.” 202

The following two examples illustrate this point:
Motor Vehicle Emissions Standards (the California example): Policy
reducing auto emissions has toggled back and forth, primarily between
California and the federal government through multiple iterations, with
each level of government spurring on the other (vertically) and with
California’s example paving the way for other states (horizontally). 203

Hale, supra note 111, at 2–3.
Carlson, supra note 106, at 1099.
203 Id. at 1107–09, 1128 (“California has led the way in pushing increasingly strict mobile
source emissions standards.”).
201
202
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Because of the problems of traffic and smog in the Los Angeles area,
California had an incentive to act in ways that few other states did. 204
Several environmental law scholars analyze the need for a strong
federal role through the framework of the tragedy of the commons
problem. 205 Indeed, there is a history of states opting for lax
environmental regulation and externalizing the effect of this weak
regulation. 206 This is particularly true with cars. Because they are mobile
and there is, by definition, a national market for them, states have an
incentive to externalize the problem of auto emissions beyond the state
of manufacture. 207 However, we might also observe the failure of states
to reduce auto emissions in cars that are manufactured there as a
tipping problem, where few states had an incentive to act in the first
place. Given that states, such as California in the automobile context
(and Gulf states in the context of rising sea levels and the problem of
flooding), are affected by climate change in disparate ways, certain states
in fact do have incentives to be first movers in particular contexts.
In the area of reducing auto emissions, California paved the way,
initially through legislation in 1960, 208 which laid the groundwork for
Congress to adopt the Clean Air Act in 1963. 209 As of September 2018,
twelve states and the District of Columbia were following California’s
auto emission standards, 210 as other states are permitted to do under the
federal Clean Air Act. 211 California’s requirements include one
specifying that auto manufacturers “generate a certain number of Zero
Emission Vehicle [] credits, depending upon the number of vehicles
produced and delivered within the state.” 212

Id. at 1110.
Hale, supra note 111, at 1.
206 Carlson, supra note 106, at 1099 (noting “the free rider incentives are large” regarding
carbon emissions).
207 Id. at 1139 (discussing how the fact that cars are part of a national market supports the
argument for federal regulation).
208 Id. at 1110.
209 Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7401–31 et seq. (2018)).
210 Barboza, supra note 162.
211 Engel, supra note 19, at 68–69.
212 Id. at 69.
204
205
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In the past, Congress has passed legislation to preempt other states
from adopting “any standard relating to the control of emissions from
new motor vehicles,” but exempted California. 213 Through this dynamic,
the federal government has quasi-deputized California as a
“superregulator,” wherein other states could choose to follow the federal
or the California standard. 214 Because California has the largest
automobile market in the country, many states and manufacturers opt
to follow the California (more stringent) standard. 215 While the Obama
administration provided a waiver for California’s progressively more
stringent auto emission standards, as discussed in Section II.A.5, supra,
the Trump administration threat to rescind the waiver and issue its own
standards would, in effect, end the ability of states (such as California)
to continue the progress in reducing auto emissions. 216
Cap-and-Trade Schemes: While the first mover with the auto
emission standards was California, states have not necessarily always
been the first to act in iterative federalism schemes. 217 The first cap-andtrade scheme was established by Congress when it enacted the Acid
Rain Program in 1990 to reduce GHGs emitted from power plants. 218
This set the stage for the creation of a regional group, the Ozone
Transport Commission (OTC), which was established as part of the
Clean Air Act amendments of 1990. The OTC was designed to prod
northeastern states to combat ozone pollution on a regional basis and
established a regional cap-and-trade program. 219 While the OTC was
213

1111.

Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a), (b)(1) (2018). See also Carlson, supra note 106, at

Carlson, supra note 106, at 1100, 1107.
Id. at 1141 (referring to California and explaining that by giving California a waiver to set
a higher standard in reducing auto emissions, the federal government was “granting the state
with the largest market share of automobiles in the country the ability to set more stringent
standards and thus serve as a single laboratory of democracy”); see also id. at 1124 (discussing
how over time, many other states chose to follow California); Barboza, supra note 162
(explaining that the California standard is followed by a dozen other countries and the District
of Columbia).
216 Carlson, supra note 153, at 2.
217 Carlson, supra note 106, at 1141.
218 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–61f (2016).
219 Carlson, supra note 106, at 1145 (noting that “these same states had already started to
work cooperatively in the 1980s to coordinate efforts to combat acid rain. By the time the OTC
was established, many environmental officials from these states already had cooperative
working relationships”). Carlson notes, “Sources that reduce their emissions below their
214
215
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successful in reducing GHG emissions, downwind northeast states
continued to experience significant cross-border pollution not from
fellow OTC members, but from upwind states in the Midwest and
Southeast. 220 To address this more widespread regional problem, the
EPA expanded the OTC cap-and-trade program to a broader array of
states. The current iteration is the Regional Greenhouse Gas
Initiative. 221
How Norm Cascades Occur and Other Lessons Learned: To
understand why policy has bounced back and forth between federal and
sub-federal governments in these case studies of climate change
mitigation, it is useful to consider the notion of “norm cascades”
developed by IR scholars, who use the tipping problem idea to theorize
how norms tip and diffuse regionally and globally. 222 Applying the
notion of norm cascades to climate change mitigation yields a better
understanding of why states (and the federal government) adopt the
policies they do. For example, “regulation at the state and local level can
prompt burdened interest groups to appeal to higher jurisdictional
regulators for relief from the costs of inconsistent lower-level
regulation.” 223
The auto emissions example poses lessons that highlight the value
of allowing first movers to assist with tipping a norm, in contrast to a
pure preference for either nationalization or decentralization. Along
these lines, Richard Revesz has argued that devolution of environmental
policymaking to the states can assist more in producing socially optimal
levels of regulation, based on competition rather than centralized
policymaking. 224 As a laboratory of experimentation, California was able
to take on the risks (and enjoy the benefits) of innovation. In some
instances, California made some costly misjudgments in the direction of
allowances may trade, sell, or bank the excess, while sources that exceed their emissions
allowances are subject to hefty financial penalties.” Id. at 1144.
220 Id. at 1149.
221 Id. at 1149–52.
222 Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887 (1998).
223 Engel, supra note 19, at 71 (describing this in the context of a related concept she
describes as a “domino effect”).
224 Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race to the
Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992).
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both over- and under-regulation (due in part to imperfect information
and scientific uncertainty). 225 But by allowing California to experiment,
these missteps were limited to one jurisdiction, providing opportunities
for learning and improvement as policy innovation was taken up at the
federal level.
As the experience of California also suggests, while wholesale
devolution was not necessary, allowing California to be at least one
laboratory of experimentation avoids the type of “race to the bottom”
and other problems that concern proponents of nationalization.226
Perceptively, Professor Carlson observes that iterative federalism
arrangements “reject a central assumption among virtually all
federalism theories[, which presume] that states are to be treated as a
single analytic unit.” 227 Indeed, in the case of auto emissions, it was only
a single jurisdiction (i.e., California) that was designated as a
“superregulator.” In the cap-and-trade case, a single regional body had
authority. 228 Both cases involved the blessing of the federal government,
but not without some degree of contestation and negotiation. The
iterative effect of policy shifting back and forth between federal and subfederal actors helped catalyze and tip the norm to wider acceptance in
both case studies.
While there are clear benefits of incentivizing first movers at the
state and local level, there are also solid economic arguments in favor of
national preemption in an inherently national market, such as in the
automobile sector, under circumstances where the federal government
is committed to addressing information asymmetries and the problem
of special interests who seek to externalize the negative effects of their
own environmentally unfriendly behavior. For one, the federal
government often has “superior resources and the ability to conduct
more sophisticated, coordinated research and development.” 229 Second,
there can be a significant value in capturing efficiencies of scale when
manufacturers only have to follow one national standard in producing

Carlson, supra note 106, at 1137–38.
Id. at 1138.
227 Id. at 1107. Cf. Gerken, supra note 22, at 1720 (“For all intents and purposes, however,
there aren’t fifty independent laboratories these days; there are two. One is red, one is blue[.]”).
228 Carlson, supra note 106, at 1107.
229 Id. at 1104.
225
226

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3155282

Powell.40.6.6 (Do Not Delete)

2019]

7/15/2019 4:43 PM

WE THE PEOPLE

2741

the same product for consumers in all fifty states. 230 Third, national
regulation is useful because in the auto market, states (and
manufacturers) can cost externalize—and avoid internalizing the costs
of regulation. 231 As Rick Hills has observed, “Cars are not manufactured
in California, so California’s politicians can safely urge tough standards,
knowing that the costs will be borne by out-of-state businesses, their
employees, and their shareholders.” 232
The cap-and-trade example also highlights the value of the federal
government’s role where interstate externalities make it less likely for
any particular state (or group of states) to be a first mover. 233 Moreover,
federal law “may reinforce or strengthen voter preferences within a
particular state or region for environmental change[,]” where otherwise
voters (or interest groups, such as business or other lobbyists) may
prefer more lax standards, precipitating a race to the bottom. 234
However, the federal government today has signaled hostility,
rather than an inclination to address the problem of externalizing
negative effects, much less the information asymmetries inherent in the
highly technical field of climate science. Thus, first movers, such as
California and others, will need to continue to exercise leadership,
incentivized by their own pragmatic or even ideational motives, to tip
the climate change mitigation norm in a direction that will not only
secure compliance with the Paris Agreement, but more importantly, will
also help address the negative effects of climate change.
In sum, the initiative of state and local governments (and regional
alliances) in addressing environmental protection concerns, such as
climate change, is critical. This is particularly true where the federal
government is not committed to addressing market failures—and
Id. at 1138–40.
Id. at 1140.
232 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the
National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 23 n.74 (2007). Robert Cooter and Neil Siegel
advance a similar point in positing the idea “collective action federalism” to suggest that
Congress has some authority to regulate “noncommercial harms that spill over state
boundaries, such as certain environmental problems,” where, otherwise, under the Commerce
Clause, Congress is restricted to only regulating commercial activity. Robert D. Cooter & Neil
S. Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 STAN. L. REV.
115, 119–20 (2010).
233 Carlson, supra note 106, at 1154.
234 Id. at 1158.
230
231
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instead seems intent on reinforcing them. Certainly, the federal
government has a potentially important coordination role to play (given
the advantages discussed above). But, in the meantime, the leadership of
sub-federal government actors can build support for climate change
policy at the national level.
C.

Applying Lessons from Global Governance to Federalism

This Section extracts the lessons gleaned from global
environmental governance and IR scholarship to further clarify how
sub-federal governments can address the political market failures that
are apparent in climate policy. To recap, these failures include (1) lack
of information due to the subversion of science, knowledge, and
information, as well as (2) the regulatory capture of climate policy by
powerful minority economic interests, who are determined to
externalize the costs of their climate unfriendly behavior. While today,
the federal government stands by (or, worse, reinforces these failures), it
is up to sub-federal governments to address these challenges and to set
the stage for an eventual shift to new climate policy at the federal level.
In considering the diffusion of policies aimed at mitigating climate
change, it is tempting to view the norm cascade sweeping through at
least some state and local jurisdictions as motivated by a common
purpose. Under the standard tragedy of the commons analysis, we may
assume that all jurisdictions have similar, if not identical, motives.235
However, in order to explain the fact that certain jurisdictions have been
first and more aggressive movers in reducing greenhouse gas emissions,
it is apparent that some actors—such as California—have different
interests and motives.
As Hale explains, certain mitigation steps taken by particular
jurisdictions may not even be viewed as primarily climate policy per
se: 236
[Rather,] [m]any [] “co-benefits” may come along with specific
mitigation actions, including reducing local air pollution and
improving human health, increasing energy security and reliability,
235
236

Hale, supra note 111, at 16.
Id.
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developing new industrial sectors, preserving forests, [reducing
traffic,] etc. In some cases, these co-benefits temper the cost of
mitigation actions; in other cases, the other benefits are governments’
primary focus, and mitigation is an ancillary result. 237

Even where there are net costs to climate regulation, there may be other
incentives or ideational preferences—such as the value of upholding a
“green” policy (as is certainly the case with particular corporate actors
and even public pension funds who operate under stated ethical or other
requirements). 238
Further, while the economic literature on climate change often
assigns a discount rate to future benefits of climate mitigation—
assigning a lower value to the benefit realized in the future than the cost
born now—this reasoning can be misleading once we, again, consider
that today’s jurisdictions are not necessarily similarly situated. For
example, “[f]or small island states, arid countries near the equator, and
coastal cities, the impacts are already severe and will become
existential.” 239
For these reasons, it makes sense to assess climate policy not only
within the framework of the standard tragedy of the commons analysis,
but also to recognize that climate policy involves a “tipping point
structure.”240 By viewing climate policy as a tipping problem, we can
view the Paris climate process as a “catalytic” institutional process that
assists states, sub-state, and non-state actors in cooperating to shift
actors’ propensity to take steps over time and to progressively intensify
the level or commitment and steps taken, as they learn-by-doing and
generate increasing returns. 241

Id.
Id.
239 Id. at 17.
240 Id. at 2–3.
241 Id. at 22. Hale discusses elements of the catalytic approach, which he indicates includes
measures that: (1) shape future expectations and aspirations; (2) stimulate first-movers and
incremental action through flexibility; (3) are an iteration of commitments; (4) and increase the
effect of prior action on subsequent action (through (a) material transfers to alter future
preferences and capacities; (b) transferring experiences to shape the informational
environment; (c) normative benchmarking; and (d) domestic constituency-building). Id.
237
238
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III. SANCTUARY JURISDICTIONS
In this Part, I identify how sanctuary jurisdiction policies represent
a merger of local and global concerns in a way that addresses John Hart
Ely’s insight about underrepresentation of minority rights as a political
market failure. To provide a contrast with the climate policy case study
above, Section III.A provides background by discussing the
international law framework concerning immigrants. Section III.B then
turns to an examination of the rise of sanctuary jurisdictions within the
United States as a response to federal immigration and refugee policies.
Section III.C provides a typology of today’s sanctuary policies aimed at
disentanglement from the federal immigration enforcement apparatus.
In examining what motivates these policies, Section III.C also reflects on
the extent to which these sub-federal initiatives address the problem of
minority underrepresentation. Section III.D revisits the notion of norm
cascades and tipping problems, discussed supra (in Part II on climate
policy), to examine how state and local sanctuary policies may assist in
tipping norms concerning the treatment of immigrants in one direction
or another.
Tipping the norm of fair treatment could help address the fact that
the political process has failed to protect the rights and dignity of
humans who, despite their formal lack of status as citizens, are entitled
to respect, simplify by virtue of our shared humanity (as international
human rights law asserts, grounded in Immanuel Kant’s notion of
human dignity). 242 However, conversely, given Trump’s efforts to
encourage states, counties, and localities to cooperate with his draconian
deportation policies, 243 the norm could also tip in the direction of
stigmatizing immigrants further. But adapting Ely’s concern regarding
the minority underrepresentation problem as a failure of democracy, my
normative approach is to argue that sub-federal governments should
safeguard equality and dignity of immigrants, if for no other reason than

IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 49 (Lewis W. Beck trans.,
1st ed. 1959). Kant’s theory of human dignity provides an important theoretical underpinning
for the contemporary human rights idea, as he claimed that “rational beings are designated
‘persons’ because their nature indicates that they are ends in themselves, i.e., things which may
not be used merely as means.” Id. at 46.
243 For further discussion, see infra Section III.B.
242
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to strengthen a relationship of trust with immigrant communities and to
advance local goals concerning fairness, thereby enhancing the efficacy
of criminal justice and other policies. Such local concerns are well
within the authority of states, counties, and localities—quite separate
and apart from the federal government’s immigration authority 244—as
demonstrated in my discussion of federalism doctrine below.
A.

Shortcomings of the International Framework on Immigrants

This Section provides background by discussing the dearth of
international law protections for immigrants. I examine how, despite
international law’s aspiration to address both collective action failures
and minority rights, in reality, the international framework concerning
immigrants is weak to nonexistent.
As mentioned in the Introduction to this Article, while both
climate and sanctuary policies address inherently transnational
concerns, the climate change case study (discussed supra) indicates
greater potential for international cooperation because of the Paris
architecture. In contrast, sanctuary jurisdictions today do not, by and
large, look to international agreements or norms as a reference point for
protective policies toward immigrants (though, as discussed infra,
earlier sanctuary policy did).
While immigration is an inherently transnational matter,
international standards protecting immigrants are sparse and in many
cases nonbinding. Despite the existence of elaborate international rules
concerning the movement of goods and trade more broadly, there is a
dearth of international law on the movement of people. 245
As discussed in Parts I and II, international law is a regime created
by nation-states. Rather than the traditional view of the nation-state as a
“black box,” contemporary international law and IR scholars analyze the
positions that countries take on the international stage as reflecting
political preferences of those who wield power domestically in these

244 Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L.
REV. 787 (2008).
245 For discussion of this asymmetry, see, for example, THOMAS, supra note 53.
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various nations. 246 As nation-states reflect these preferences, it may
sometimes be in the interest of their governments to agree to certain
international standards regarding trade; however, in immigration
matters, it is in the interest of powerful nations (who are the receiving
countries for immigrants) to address transnational concerns on
immigrants through bi-lateral agreement, diplomacy, or other discrete
mechanisms. 247
Thus, while political refugees are protected under the Refugee
Convention and Protocol, 248 there are few international legal protections
for so-called economic migrants. To help close this gap, the Global
Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration (Global Compact on
Migration) was adopted in December 2018. 249 The aim for the Global
Compact is to promote international cooperation on migration issues;
however, the United States rejected it. 250 In any event, it is non-binding.
Broadly speaking, some sanctuary jurisdictions justify policies
based on norms that are protected in international human rights law
contained in binding treaties, which include commitments related to
equality, inclusive communities, racial profiling, due process, fairness,
and human dignity. 251 However, state and local officials are not citing to
246 Putnam, supra note 29 (recognizing that national-level policymakers in international
negotiations face constituencies at both domestic and international levels and exploring the
intertwining of the two).
247 Jennifer Gordon, People Are Not Bananas: How Immigration Differs from Trade, 104 NW.
U. L. REV. 1109, 1139–42 (2010). It is possible that the absence of strong international law
protecting immigrants may itself reflect a collective action problem. But, alternatively, it may
represent a conscious decision by states to preserve their longstanding discretion to exclude
non-nationals (as Gordon’s work suggests).
248 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S.
137; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
The United States is a party to the Refugee Protocol. Id.
249 Nick Cumming-Bruce, U.N. Approves Sweeping Deal on Migration, But Without U.S.
Support, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/10/world/europe/unmigration-deal-morocco.html [https://perma.cc/M9W6-SJEB].
250 Press Release, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, National Statement of the United
States of America on the Adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular
Migration (Dec. 7, 2018), https://usun.state.gov/remarks/8841 [https://perma.cc/9HW2EXVG].
251 See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 42, art. 2; id. art. 26 (on equality norms); id. art. 23 (on
family rights); G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 1, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10,
1948) (on dignity) [hereinafter UDHR]. Note that the United States is a party to the ICCPR.
While the UDHR is non-binding, it has been adopted by nearly every country, and the United
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nor rallying around international standards the way mayors and
governors have explicitly done in the climate change context,
particularly in the aftermath of the President’s Paris accord withdrawal
announcement.
B.

Four Waves of “Sanctuary” Policies

This Section explores the emergence of subnational sanctuary
jurisdictions. As mentioned, unlike the climate policy context, subfederal policy innovators in the sanctuary context have largely not
rallied around international norms per se (with the exception of the first
wave of sanctuary policies during the 1980s, discussed directly below).
Yet even from their initial emergence, many sanctuary policies aim to
address norms embodied in international standards regarding fair
treatment and the rights of minorities. Immigrants in the United States
are, as a group, a minority that is, essentially by definition,
underrepresented in the political process. 252
The term “sanctuary jurisdiction” is itself somewhat of a misnomer
today, in the sense that it now applies to a range of jurisdictions
motivated by a variety of concerns beyond the original ones that
prompted the initial wave of sanctuary policies, which were aimed at
providing sanctuary from deportation. 253 Sanctuary policies in recent
U.S. history have proceeded in four successive waves, each oriented in
varying degrees to address the problem of minority underrepresentation
of immigrants. 254
First, sanctuary policies originally grew out of both a churchcentered movement as well as a concern by local law enforcement
regarding the influx of Central American refugees who fled civil wars in
States played a leadership role in its development, with Eleanor Roosevelt as chair of the U.N.
committee that drafted it. GLENDON, supra note 57.
252 See discussion supra Part I regarding how undocumented immigrants are largely denied
the right to vote or ability to run for federal office.
253 Fact Sheet: Understanding Trust Acts, Community Policing, and “Sanctuary Cities”, AM.
IMMIGR. COUNCIL (Oct. 10, 2015), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/
sanctuary-cities-trust-acts-and-community-policing-explained#.WHXPfy6tdDc.email [https://
perma.cc/CDB4-QRV3].
254 The framework for the four waves of policies is introduced and discussed more
thoroughly in Lai & Lasch, supra note 106, at 546–48.
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the 1980s but were denied asylum in the United States. Churches,
synagogues, and other religious institutions came together to oppose the
repatriation of refugees to the countries they had fled because they
feared persecution. This movement became known as the Sanctuary
Movement. At its height, over 150 congregations publicly defied the
federal government, openly sponsoring and supporting undocumented
refugee families, largely from El Salvador and Guatemala. 255
Sanctuary cities sprung up during this period as well, out of
concern for what was perceived as the federal government’s lack of
compliance with international law, based on the U.S. government’s
rejection of refugee applications from Central Americans. 256 In some
cases, these cities referred to international human rights standards
concerning the treatment of refugees. For example, the city of Davis,
California adopted a resolution declaring that “the citizens of Davis are
concerned about violations of human rights throughout the world.” 257
The Davis resolution also invoked the fact that in enacting the Refugee
Act of 1980, Congress had adopted the definition of “refugee” found in
the U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 258 Further, the
Davis resolution mentioned that the U.N. High Commission on
Refugees had “recognized that persons fleeing El Salvador and
Guatemala are bona fide political refugees, yet fewer than two percent
are being granted that status by the U.S. Immigration and

255 Catherine Powell, The United Divided States: San Francisco Sues Donald Trump for
Sanctuary Cities Order, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 13, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/37589/
united-divided-states-san-francisco-sues-donald-trump-sanctuary-cities-order
[https://
perma.cc/L8MH-FYNZ].
256 See Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133, 142–43 (2008)
(discussing that in the 1980s, municipalities—which we now refer to as “sanctuary cities”—
adopted non-cooperation policies alongside churches that provided safe havens to Central
American migrants).
257 Davis, Cal., Res. 5407 (Mar. 5, 1986). While the resolution has been updated, the most
recent one incorporates the original resolution (containing the references to human rights and
refugee law) by reference. Mayor Daniel M. Wolk, Resolution No. 14-153, Series 2014:
Resolution Reaffirming and Promoting Davis as a City of Sanctuary (Nov. 5, 2014), http://
documents.cityofdavis.org/Media/Default/Documents/PDF/CMO/Sanctuary-City/Resolution14-153-Reaffirming-Davis%20-as-a-Sanctuary-City.pdf [https://perma.cc/7E99-U5R9].
258 Id. For analysis of how the Refugee Act of 1980 incorporates the definition of refugee
found in the U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, see Joan Fitzpatrick, The
International Dimension of U.S. Refugee Law, 15 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1 (1997).
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Naturalization Service.” 259 Before being updated in recent years, the
original sanctuary ordinance in San Francisco also referred to human
rights violations in El Salvador, as well as the responsibility of the
United States to political refugees fleeing El Salvador and Guatemala. 260
Along with the rise of these early sanctuary cities, the religious
activists in the church-centered movement drew upon the emerging use
of international human rights norms by U.S. advocates more broadly,
invoking the principles of personal accountability developed in the
Nuremburg tribunals, to justify what the federal government considered
alien smuggling. Others in the Sanctuary Movement referred to it as a
new “Underground Railroad,” drawing on religious and moral
principles of the nineteenth century U.S. abolitionist movement and
building off of the experience of the 1960s with civil disobedience
campaigns against racial segregation. Some activists paid a price for this
advocacy, with the Reagan Justice Department criminally prosecuting a
small handful of the activists in the Sanctuary Movement. 261
The second wave of sanctuary policies, however, was more directly
related to the emergence of the crim-immigration regime and “federal
pressure on local jurisdictions to participate in immigration
enforcement,” 262 which have blurred the lines of federal and state
authority. While immigration law is a federal matter, 263 criminal law has
traditionally been viewed as falling within the realm of state and local
law. 264 As Annie Lai and Christopher Lasch explain, “the second wave of
Res. 5407, supra note 257, at 1.
For San Francisco’s original “City and County of Refuge” Ordinance, see S.F., Cal.,
Ordinance 375-89 (Oct. 16, 1989), http://citizenrobo.org/statute/4050/attachment/272 [https://
perma.cc/6SV5-WJG5]. For further background, see Sanctuary City Ordinance, OFF. CIVIC
ENGAGEMENT & IMMIGRANT AFF., CITY & COUNTY S.F., https://sfgov.org/oceia/sanctuary-cityordinance-0 [https://perma.cc/J4CA-XVBX] (last visited Apr. 14, 2019).
261 Susan Gzesh, Central Americans and Asylum Policy in the Reagan Era, MIGRATION POL’Y
INST. (Apr. 1, 2006) https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/central-americans-and-asylumpolicy-reagan-era [https://perma.cc/YU5F-LAB9].
262 Lai & Lasch, supra note 106, at 545–46. While some scholars use the term
“crimmigration,” I am using the term “crim-immigration” to emphasize the contestation
between local criminal law and federal immigration enforcement. For a thoughtful discussion
of efforts to merge criminal law and immigration law—and efforts to resist this merger—see id.
263 See discussion supra Section I.D.
264 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601–06, 618 (2000) (striking down the civil
remedy in the Violence Against Women Act and finding that “[t]he regulation and punishment
of intrastate violence . . . has always been the province of the States.”); United States v. Lopez,
259
260
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sanctuary policies followed [federal] legislation in the 1990s and a legal
opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel after September 11th that
sanctioned arrests by local law enforcement for violations of civil
immigration laws.” 265 In response, sanctuary policies, enacted in the
decade following the September 11th attacks, “challenged the federal
government’s . . . assertion of cooperative immigration enforcement as
essential to domestic security.” 266
The third wave of policies was prompted by resistance to the
“Secure Communities” program, initiated under President George W.
Bush, and continued under President Barack Obama. This wave of
resistance “likewise arose as a response to federal pressure on local law
enforcement to participate in immigration enforcement . . . .” 267 Secure
Communities created a system whereby the biometric fingerprint data
of every person booked into a local jail whose fingerprints are run
through the Federal Bureau of Information National Crime Information
Center database and automatically shared with federal immigration
officials. After the number of deportations hit record numbers, leading
to severe criticism of President Obama, his administration ended Secure
Communities. 268
The fourth wave of policies was triggered by the campaign and
election of Donald Trump. During his campaign for President,
candidate Trump ran on a nativist platform, claiming he would “Make
America [G]reat [A]gain.” 269 He described Mexican immigrants as
rapists and drug dealers, saying, “[t]hey’re bringing drugs. They’re
bringing crime. They’re rapists.” 270 Thus, he promised to build a wall on
514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (referring to the prohibition on guns in school zones as “a general
police power of the sort retained by the States”).
265 Lai & Lasch, supra note 106, at 546.
266 Trevor George Gardner, The Promise and Peril of the Anti-Commandeering Rule in the
Homeland Security Era: Immigrant Sanctuary as an Illustrative Case, 34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 313, 315, 324 (2015) (describing “second wave” of sanctuary policies from 2001–2008).
267 Lai & Lasch, supra note 106, at 546–47.
268 Id. at 547–48.
269 Kelly J. Baker, Make America White Again?, ATLANTIC (Mar. 12, 2016), https://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/donald-trump-kkk/473190
[https://perma.cc/
2LXV-MRSV].
270 Donald Trump Transcript: ‘Our Country Needs a Truly Great Leader’, WALL STREET J.
(June 16, 2015, 2:29 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2015/06/16/donald-trumptranscript-our-country-needs-a-truly-great-leader.
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the southern border of the United States as a centerpiece of this
campaign. 271 In addition to expressing a desire to ban Muslims from the
United States, 272 once elected, within days of taking office, Trump issued
a series of executive orders barring visitors mainly from predominantly
Muslim countries. 273 He reportedly referred to African countries and
Haiti as “sh-thole” countries and indicated, by contrast, a preference for
visitors from Norway. 274 Trump also granted a presidential pardon to
Sheriff Joe Arpaio, 275 who was convicted for contempt of court for
“repeatedly and knowingly disobey[ing a federal judge’s] orders to cease
policing tactics against Latinos that [the judge ruled] amount to
systemic racial profiling,” in the context of what Arpaio claimed was a
crack-down on undocumented immigration. 276
On sanctuary jurisdictions specifically, as both a candidate and
now as President, Trump has promoted the notion that sanctuary
jurisdictions generate and protect immigrant crime. 277 He has promoted
271 Amber Phillips, The First Brick Hasn’t Been Set and Trump’s Border Wall Is Already
Going South on Him, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2017/04/24/4-reasons-trumps-border-wall-is-already-going-south-on-him/?utm_term=.
d597b8cf5a35 [https://perma.cc/NCA2-YDYX].
272 Jeremy Diamond, Trump’s Latest Executive Order: Banning People from 7 Countries and
More, CNN (Jan. 29, 2017, 4:38 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/01/27/politics/donald-trumprefugees-executive-order/index.html [https://perma.cc/QV85-PP5Z].
273 Id.
274 “Sh*thole Countries” Respond to Trump’s Rhetoric, CBS NEWS (Jan. 12, 2018, 10:29 AM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-shthole-countries-response-from-haiti-africael-salvador [https://perma.cc/6ZPZ-E9ZP].
275 Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Maggie Haberman, Trump Pardons Joe Arpaio, Who Became
Face of Crackdown on Illegal Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/08/25/us/politics/joe-arpaio-trump-pardon-sheriff-arizona.html
[https://perma.cc/S8GQ-7UMW].
276 Merrit Kennedy, In Racial Profiling Lawsuit, Ariz. Judge Rules Sheriff Arpaio in Contempt
of Court, NPR (May 14, 2016, 11:22 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/05/
14/478050934/in-racial-profiling-lawsuit-ariz-judge-rules-sheriff-arpaio-in-contempt-of-court
[https://perma.cc/QNN9-DX42]; see also Colin Dwyer, Ex-Sheriff Joe Arpaio Convicted of
Criminal Contempt, NPR (July 31, 2017, 4:08 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/
2017/07/31/540629884/ex-sheriff-joe-arpaio-convicted-of-criminal-contempt
[https://
perma.cc/3W6K-8652].
277 For example, Trump has prominently pointed to the killing of Kathryn Steinle in San
Francisco by an undocumented immigrant, who was ultimately acquitted of murder. Daniel
Arkin, Kathryn Steinle Shooting: Politics Aside, Experts Say Verdict Based on Reasonable Doubt,
NBC NEWS (Dec. 1, 2017, 4:03 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/kathryn-steinleshooting-politics-aside-experts-say-verdict-based-reasonable-n825731 [https://perma.cc/XZ33-
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misleading claims linking sanctuary jurisdictions and crime, by relying
“on a rhetoric of immigrant criminality to support his harsh
immigration enforcement” and by characterizing sanctuary jurisdictions
“as dangerous and harmful.” 278 However, evidence indicates that
immigrants, including undocumented immigrants, are less likely to
commit crime than native-born U.S. citizens. 279
Fulfilling a campaign promise to “cancel all federal funding to
sanctuary cities,” 280 President Trump issued his so-called sanctuary
jurisdictions executive order—entitled “Enhancing Public Safety in the
Interior of the United States” 281 on January 25, 2017, shortly after he
came into office. Section 9(a) of the Order threatens to withhold
unspecified federal funding to jurisdictions that “willfully refuse to
comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373.” 282 Subsection 1373(a) provides that a “local
government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict,
any government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from,
[federal immigration officials] information regarding the citizenship or

UUNG]. The defendant, Jose Ines Garcia Zarate, had been deported five times (but returned
to the United States). Id. He was acquitted of the most serious charges—first-degree murder,
second-degree murder, and involuntary manslaughter, likely because of the presence of
reasonable doubt—but was found guilty of illegal possession of a firearm. Id.
278 Lasch et al., supra note 7.
279 Note a 2017 report by the Cato Institute, stating, “All immigrants are less likely to be
incarcerated than natives relative to their shares of the population. Even illegal immigrants are
less likely to be incarcerated than native-born Americans.” Michelangelo Landgrave & Alex
Nowrasteh, Criminal Immigrants: Their Numbers, Demographics, and Countries of Origin,
CATO INST. (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.cato.org/publications/immigration-reformbulletin/criminal-immigrants-their-numbers-demographics-countries#full [https://perma.cc/
S6QS-PFMS]. See also Salvador Rizzo, Trump’s Claim That Immigrants Bring ‘Tremendous
Crime’ Is Still Wrong, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/factchecker/wp/2018/01/18/trumps-claim-that-immigrants-bring-tremendous-crime-is-stillwrong/?utm_term=.d0c678f6b74d [https://perma.cc/9JBW-KP6L] (giving Trump’s claims four
Pinocchios, which denotes an entirely false statement, and noting that “the violent crime rate
was cut nearly by half during a period in which unauthorized immigrants tripled”). For an
explanation of the Washington Post’s Pinocchio scale, see Glenn Kessler, About the Fact
Checker, WASH. POST (Jan. 1, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/01/07/
about-fact-checker/?utm_term=.d42c25d1792f [https://perma.cc/2UNN-H6JK].
280 DONALD J. TRUMP, DONALD TRUMP’S CONTRACT WITH THE AMERICAN VOTER (2016),
https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/_landings/contract/O-TRU-102316-Contractv02.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VBF9-AFF9].
281 Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
282 Id.
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immigration status . . . of any individual.” 283 Although Trump’s
definition of “sanctuary city” has is hardly a model of precision, the
Executive Order defines a “sanctuary jurisdiction” as one “that willfully
refuse[s] to comply with 8 U.S.C. 1373.”284
San Francisco—which Trump has singled out for criticism and
which was involved in the earliest challenge to Trump’s sanctuary
jurisdictions executive order—initially became a sanctuary city in 1989
in response to the Central American refugee crisis, but the goals behind
its sanctuary city status today are far broader. The city’s Administrative
Code Chapter 12H.1 “affirms that the City and County of San Francisco
is a City and County of Refuge.” “Additionally, Chapter 12I of the San
Francisco Administrative Code emphasizes the importance of fostering
‘respect between law enforcement and residents’ in particular ‘to
ensure . . . community security, and due process for all.’” 285
Such sanctuary jurisdictions are popping up not only in blue states,
like California, but even in deep red states, like Georgia, Louisiana, and
Alabama, as well as in the Rust Belt. 286 Numerous cities—including
Austin, Chicago, the District of Columbia, Houston, Los Angeles,
Minneapolis, New Orleans, New York, and Santa Clara—have enacted
sanctuary laws. While these laws vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction in
scope, “one element they share in common is a commitment to limit the
use of local resources in implementing and enforcing federal
immigration laws,” which these jurisdictions “view as not only
infringing on their sovereignty to define local policy, but as being at
odds with local policy goals, such as building trust between local law
enforcement and communities to more effectively reduce crime and
improve public safety.” 287

8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2018).
Powell, supra note 255; Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 25, 2017).
285 See Powell, supra note 255; see also S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE §§ 12H, 12I (1989).
286 Jasmine C. Lee, Rudy Omri & Julia Preston, What Are Sanctuary Cities?, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/09/02/us/sanctuary-cities.html?
emc=eta1&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/J633-828G]; see also Powell, supra note 255.
287 Powell, supra note 255.
283
284
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“We the People” and “Sanctuary” Policies

This Section evaluates in greater detail how today’s sanctuary
policies are addressing the problem of minority underrepresentation as
a political market failure. Subsection III.C.1 provides a typology of
sanctuary policies aimed at disentanglement from the federal
immigration enforcement apparatus. Subsection III.C.2 examines what
motivates these policies, and reflects on the extent to which sub-federal
initiatives are directly addressing the problem of minority
underrepresentation or merely addressing this problem as a byproduct
of more pragmatic concerns.
1.

Typology of Sanctuary Policies Aimed at Disentanglement

While jurisdictions adopting protective policies have been crudely
lumped together under the “sanctuary jurisdiction” label, here I sketch
out a typology that describes seven different types of sanctuary policies,
along a spectrum of increasing disengagement with Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE).288 While some of these disentanglement
288 Note that I have drawn this typology from Immigration Legal Resource Center (ILRC).
KRSNA AVILA ET AL., IMMIGRATION LEGAL RES. CTR., THE RISE OF SANCTUARY: GETTING
LOCAL OFFICERS OUT OF THE BUSINESS OF DEPORTATIONS IN THE TRUMP ERA (2018), https://
www.ilrc.org/sites/default/files/resources/rise_of_sanctuary-lg-20180201.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YGP6-P4PK] [hereinafter ILRC, THE RISE OF SANCTUARY] (surveying 3,015 of the 3,140
countries and county equivalents in the United States). See also Lasch et al., supra note 7, at
1712, 1723–36 (describing similar “types of criminal justice policies that [cities] have adopted to
disentangle their law enforcement systems from [] federal immigration enforcement.”). The
typology adopted by Lasch covers sanctuary cities, not counties (nor states). But summaries of
sanctuary policies by the ILRC, Lasch, and others reflect similar categories of policies,
regardless of whether at the city, state, or county level (confirming ILRC’s categorization).
Note also that the Congressional Research Service describes a useful typology by noting
that sanctuary policies are often described as falling under one of three categories:

First, so-called “don’t enforce” policies generally bar the state or local police from
assisting federal immigration authorities. Second, “don’t ask” policies generally bar
certain state or local officials from inquiring into a person’s immigration status.
Third, “don’t tell” policies typically restrict information sharing between state or
local law enforcement and federal immigration authorities.
SARAH S. HERMAN, CONGRESSIONAL RES. SERV., R44795, STATE AND LOCAL “SANCTUARY”
POLICIES LIMITING PARTICIPATION IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT (2017).
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policies began before Trump became president, others were prompted
by his election. 289
This typology is geared towards unpacking the extent and degree to
which various categories of policies are addressing the problem of
minority underrepresentation. Immigrants are subject to federal
authority, but often are not permitted to participate in electing
representatives who are responsible for passing laws and implementing
regulation. The survey here draws on data concerning counties (as
opposed to states and cities), as this information (compiled and
analyzed by the Immigration Legal Resource Center (ILRC)) is more
comprehensive than other studies and is presented in a format that
illustrates the degree of disentanglement from the federal immigration
enforcement government, which is particularly useful for my analysis
concerning tipping problems and norm cascades. 290 The study is based
on data from over 3,000 counties. 291
As counties become either increasingly or decreasingly disengaged
from the federal immigration enforcement regime (to the extent the
policies move in the direction of greater or lesser disentanglement),
collectively, these counties could overtime tip the direction norms
concerning the treatment of immigrants one way or another. The ILRC
illustrates trends that are corroborated through qualitative research
concerning the emergence of a network of sanctuary jurisdictions that
influence one another. 292
My description here begins with the category of sanctuary policies
that seek the least amount of disentanglement from the federal
immigration enforcement apparatus (and are the most common
disengagement approach). The subsequent categories discussed move
up a spectrum of increasing disengagement with ICE (with data
referring to 2017, unless otherwise indicated):
Refusal to enter into 287(g) agreements: Ninety-eight percent of
counties did not have a 287(g) agreement with the federal

See Lasch et al., supra note 7, at 1723–36.
ILRC, THE RISE OF SANCTUARY, supra note 288.
291 Id. I merely summarize this data as a rough indication of various types of sanctuary
policies.
292 Villazor & Gulasekaram, supra note 58.
289
290
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government. 293 The 287(g) program involves an optional agreement
between the jurisdiction and ICE, which essentially deputizes particular
local law enforcement agents to enforce immigration laws. 294 Only fiftysix (out of the over 3,000) counties had 287(g) agreements with ICE in
2017. 295 Because such agreements are optional, it is fairly easy for
counties to opt against entering into such agreements.
No ICE detention contract: Nearly ninety-four percent of counties
did not have a contract with ICE. 296 Such ICE detention contracts are
contracts between ICE and local jails, where ICE pays the jails to hold
immigrants in detention during their deportation proceedings. 297 As
with 287(g) agreements, entering into an ICE detention contract is
optional (though there are financial incentives to rent out space in local
jails to ICE). 298
Limits on ICE detainers (ICE holds): Twenty-four percent of
counties have policies against holding individuals beyond their
sentence, based on requests from ICE. 299 Numerically, 764 counties are
refusing to cooperate with ICE requests to hold individuals beyond their
release date as a way of providing ICE with additional time to take
custody of these individuals—a practice numerous officials in these
jurisdictions view (and some courts have held) violate the Fourth
Amendment rights of those detained. 300
Restricting notifications to ICE about information, such as release
dates: Only six percent of counties had policies against sharing
information about detainees, such as release dates, with ICE. 301 ICE asks
local agencies to provide advance notice of when immigrants will be
released from custody, so that ICE can arrest these individuals upon
release. These requests are included in immigration detainers but may
be made in other ways. 302
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302

ILRC, THE RISE OF SANCTUARY, supra note 288, at 9.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 9–10.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 4.
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Limiting ICE access to local jails and ICE interrogations of detainees:
Only four percent of counties restrict ICE’s access to jails or have put in
place safeguards on ICE’s ability to interrogate detainees. 303 Such
counties may require a judicial warrant for ICE to access limited areas
or adopt procedural protections for imprisoned immigrants so that they
can refuse interrogation by ICE agents. 304
Prohibiting inquiries into immigration status and/or place of birth:
Only four percent of counties limit their officers from asking individuals
about their immigration status. 305 The overwhelming majority of
counties allow these inquiries into immigration status. 306
General bans on participating in immigration enforcement: Only
four percent of counties have a general rule against spending time or
resources on immigration enforcement, which might include
restrictions on participating in joint operations involving immigration
enforcement. 307
2.

What Motivates Sanctuary Policies and to What Extent Do They
Address the Minority Underrepresentation Problem?

This Subsection examines the legal and policy justifications that
sanctuary jurisdictions offer to support their protective “sanctuary”
policies. These justifications draw from an excellent study by Chris
Lasch and other scholars. 308 My goal here is to investigate what
motivates these policies, and then add to the work of Lasch and his coauthors by reflecting on the extent to which these initiatives directly
address the problem of minority underrepresentation or merely address
the problem of the rights of immigrants as a byproduct of more
pragmatic concerns. This overview of justifications for sanctuary
policies starts with the more pragmatic rationales (which address the
rights of immigrants as an incidental concern) and then turns to

303
304
305
306
307
308

Id. at 9.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 9.
Id.
Id. at 4, 9.
Lasch et al., supra note 7, at 1752–53, 1771.
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rationales that are more directly tied to the rights of immigrants as
minorities who are underrepresented in the political process.
a.

Preserving Local Control over Criminal Justice

One reason for sanctuary policies is to assert that sub-federal
governments should be in control of criminal justice priorities, separate
and apart from the federal government’s responsibilities over federal
immigration enforcement. 309 Numerous sanctuary policies—in localities
ranging from New Haven to Pittsburgh to San Francisco—have asserted
a separation between local criminal justice and federal immigration
enforcement. 310 These “don’t enforce” policies bar local criminal law
enforcement officials from federal civil immigration enforcement. 311
Drawing the line between these two spheres of authority is
supported by the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence concerning
the Tenth Amendment. For example, the two anti-commandeering
cases—New York v. United States 312 and Printz v. United States 313—stand
for the proposition that the federal government cannot compel state and
local governments to use their own resources in carrying out a federal
regulatory program. At the same time, criminal justice matters fall
within the realm of traditional state and local police powers. 314

309
310

Id. at 1754.
Id. at 1755. As Lasch notes:

San Francisco[, CA] noted in adopting its “City and County of Refuge” ordinance in
1989 that state and local officials are under no obligation “to enforce the civil aspects
of the federal immigration laws.” Pittsburgh[, PA] based its 2004 direction that police
“[r]efrain from participating in the enforcement of federal immigration laws” on the
rationale that immigration laws “are solely the responsibility of the federal
government . . . .” [T]he City of New Haven, Connecticut declared that “[a]
community member’s potential status as an undocumented immigrant has no
relation to the mission or goals of the New Haven Police Department.”
Id.
311 The Congressional Research Service describes these “don’t enforce” policies as one of
several approaches by sanctuary jurisdictions. See HERMAN, supra note 288.
312 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
313 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
314 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601–06, 618 (2000) (“The regulation and
punishment of intrastate violence . . . has always been the province of the States.”); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (noting the prohibition on guns in school zones as “a
general police power of the sort retained by the States”).
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As the sanctuary policy in Cooks County, Illinois notes, “the
federal government only reimburses part of the costs associated with
ICE detainers” 315—a classic concern of the Supreme Court’s anticommandeering jurisprudence. Moreover, in considering whether ICE
has violated the Fourth Amendment (by requesting that states and
localities hold immigrants beyond the release dates), at least some courts
have found that ICE detainer requests infringe on federalism and Tenth
Amendment concerns. 316 Furthermore, courts have enjoined the
President’s threat to cut off funds to sanctuary jurisdictions (in the
sanctuary jurisdictions executive order) as a violation of, for example,
Spending Clause jurisprudence reflecting Tenth Amendment
concerns. 317
b.

Enhancing Community Trust and Community Policing

A second basis for sanctuary policies—which blends pragmatic and
minority underrepresentation considerations—is the concern that the
entanglement of street-level policing in federal immigration
enforcement undermines the trust that is necessary for community
members to feel confident in cooperating with local law enforcement. A
range of sanctuary jurisdictions—including California, Milwaukee
County, and New Haven—have pointed to the importance of building
community trust as rationales for disengaging with federal immigration
efforts. 318 Trump’s hostile statements and policies toward immigrants

315 Cook County, Ill., Ordinance 11-O-73 (Sept. 7, 2011), http://libguides.law.du.edu/ld.php?
content_id=34434520; see also Lasch et al., supra note 7, at 1756 n.270 (discussing similar
concerns expressed in the sanctuary policies of California; Philadelphia, PA; and Miami-Dade
County).
316 See, e.g., Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 644 (3d Cir. 2014).
317 See, e.g., Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (granting
preliminary injunction and finding likelihood of success on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim
that the sanctuary jurisdictions executive order is unconstitutional on the grounds that it
violates both horizontal and vertical separation of powers concerns); City & Cty. of S.F. v.
Trump, No. 17-16886, 2018 U.S. App. LEXIS 239 (9th Cir. Jan. 4, 2018) (upholding the district
court’s permanent injunction on the defunding and enforcement provisions of executive
order); Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 267 F. Supp. 3d 1201 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (concluding that
the U.S. Attorney General’s Memorandum clarifying Trump’s executive order does not change
the analysis from the PI Order and therefore denying the government’s motions for
reconsideration); see also cases discussed supra note 98.
318 Lasch et al., supra note 7, at 1761–64.
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have renewed fears in immigrant communities that interaction with
local police (and other local authorities) will result in deportation. 319
As many studies have demonstrated, “[c]ommunity trust is critical
for effective policing programs.” 320 A 2009 Police Foundation national
report warned that local law enforcement’s cooperation with ICE
undermined trust that the local police had developed with
communities. 321 Moreover, a 2013 study by University of Illinois
researchers of several counties across the country concluded that police
cooperation with ICE’s Secure Communities policy had created fear of
local law enforcement among Latinos, further undercutting trust. 322
Such fear “can cause immigrants and individuals in mixed status
families to refrain from coming forward as victims of, or witnesses to
crime.” 323 When reports of sexual assaults and spousal abuse dropped
among Latinos, in 2017, the Los Angeles Police Department indicated
that “deportation fears may be preventing Hispanic members of the
community from reporting when they are victimized.” 324

319 Id. at 1761 (explaining that “entangling street-level policing with immigration
enforcement erodes community trust”).
320 Id.; see generally DORIS MARIE PROVINE ET AL., POLICING IMMIGRANTS: LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT ON THE FRONT LINES (2016).
321 ANITA KHASHU, POLICE FOUND., THE ROLE OF LOCAL POLICE: STRIKING A BALANCE
BETWEEN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (2009), https://www.police
foundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Khashu-2009-The-Role-of-Local-Police.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D2JR-SAGT].
322 NIK THEODORE, INSECURE COMMUNITIES: LATINO PERCEPTIONS OF POLICE
INVOLVEMENT IN IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT (2013), http://www.policylink.org/sites/default/
files/INSECURE_COMMUNITIES_REPORT_FINAL.PDF
[https://perma.cc/JCT7-WG3W]
(linking police involvement in immigration enforcement with Latinos’ perceptions about public
safety and their reluctance to contact police); see also Marjorie S. Zatz & Hilary Smith,
Immigration, Crime, and Victimization: Rhetoric and Reality, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 141,
150 (2012) (collecting and analyzing empirical research).
323 Lasch et al., supra note 7, at 1762; see also THEODORE, supra note 322 (reporting on the
impact of police involvement in immigration enforcement on Latinos’ perceptions of public
safety and their willingness to contact the police).
324 News Release, L.A. Police Dep’t, Decline in Reporting of Crime Among Hispanic
Population NR17083ma (Mar. 21, 2017), http://www.lapdonline.org/home/news_view/61998
[https://perma.cc/V7TQ-5AC6] (cited by Lasch et al., supra note 7, at 1762 n.302).
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Averting Unlawful Arrests

A third ground for sanctuary policies—which also mixes pragmatic
and minority underrepresentation considerations—is the concern that
unlawful arrests lead to legal and monetary liability. This concern has
paved the way for sanctuary policies in Oregon, Colorado, Washington,
and California, which have each declared they would no longer consent
to ICE detainer requests. 325 Such concerns about liability, as a result of
entanglement with federal immigration enforcement, have grown with
the emergence of the crim-immigration regime (discussed above in
Section III.B, supra).
Furthermore, three lines of cases cabin the ability of states and
localities to participate in making and enforcing immigration law. The
first is Arizona v. United States, 326 which struck down aspects of
Arizona’s SB 1070 as preempted by federal immigration law. The second
line of cases reflects the concern that federal immigration detainers
violate the Fourth Amendment. 327 State and local law enforcement
officials (such as, prominently, then-California State Attorney General
Kamala Harris) have also expressed unease with federal detainer
requests and that cooperation with such requests could expose states
and localities to liability. 328 A third line of cases “built on the notion,
reflected in some sanctuary policies, that civil immigration arrests by
local officials must not only be authorized by federal law but by state or
local law as well.” 329
d.

Securing Equal Protection

A fourth reason for sanctuary policies—which focuses more
directly and primarily on the minority underrepresentation problem—is
grounded in two concerns based on equal protection: biased policing
Lasch et al., supra note 7, at 1758–61.
567 U.S. 387 (2012).
327 See, e.g., Galarza v. Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 645 (3d Cir. 2014); Miranda-Olivares v.
Clackamas Cty., No. 3:12-cv-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *11 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014).
328 See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen., State of Cal. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney
General Kamala D. Harris Issues Bulletin to Law Enforcement on Federal Immigration
Detainers (June 25, 2014), https://www.oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-generalkamala-d-harris-issues-bulletin-law-enforcement-federal [https://perma.cc/YK58-K579].
329 Lasch et al., supra note 7, at 1760 (citing Lunn v. Commonwealth, 78 N.E.3d 1143 (Mass.
2017)).
325
326
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and discriminatory access to police services. 330 Many jurisdictions—
including East Haven, New Orleans, and Vermont—have adopted
sanctuary policies aimed at addressing these concerns. 331
Involving local law enforcement in immigration enforcement can
increase the risk of racial profiling in policing. Even where race or
ethnicity is not an explicit factor, entangling police in immigration
matters can incline officers to use race, ethnicity, and English-language
ability as proxies for immigration status, for example, in determining
who to stop, question, and investigate. 332
Many disentanglement policies also seek to address discriminatory
barriers to accessing police services. When local law enforcement
officials are involved in federal immigration policy, policing practices
can discourage immigrants and individuals in mixed-status families
from cooperating with the police as victims of or witnesses to crime. 333
Besides the Fourteenth Amendment, 334 which bars state officials
from intentional discrimination (based on, inter alia, race, ethnicity,
nationality, an alienage), 335 Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
prohibits discrimination in state and local federally funded programs. 336
Moreover, states and localities often have their own antidiscrimination
protections.
e.

Encouraging Diversity and Inclusivity

A fifth basis for sanctuary policies—which is also centered more
directly on immigrant/minority rights—is promoting inclusive and
diverse communities. 337 For example, the sanctuary policies in Santa

Id. at 1764–65.
Id. at 1767.
332 See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, Undocumented Criminal Procedure, 58
UCLA L. REV. 1543, 1545–47 (2011) (discussing the use of race as a proxy for citizenship).
333 Lasch et al., supra note 7, at 1767–68.
334 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
335 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding discrimination against
persons of Japanese ancestry to be presumptively unconstitutional, though upholding the
internment of such persons); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (determining
that state classifications based on alienage “are inherently suspect and subject to close judicial
scrutiny”).
336 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2018).
337 Lasch et al., supra note 7, at 1769–70.
330
331
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Monica, California reflect these concerns. 338 As discussed above in
Section III.B, supra, President Trump has made numerous statements
and supported policies that are viewed as undermining inclusivity and
even racist. In response to what Santa Monica’s mayor described as
steps by the Trump administration that failed to “align with our vision
of diversity and inclusion,” 339 the city adopted a 2017 resolution that
rooted a new policing policy in the city’s embrace of diversity based on
religion, race, national or ethnic origin, gender, and sexual identity or
orientation. 340
Promoting inclusive and diverse communities “is related to but
distinct from the more legalistic emphasis on equality and
nondiscrimination that is seen in some disentanglement policies.”341
The goal of inclusivity is more forward-looking, in contrast to the
backwards-looking goal of remediating past discriminatory practices in
the criminal justice system and in police services. 342 By embracing a
broader notion of diversity and inclusion, such sanctuary policies tend
to be careful not to elevate particular categories of immigrants as “more
deserving” than other categories. 343
D.

The Treatment of Immigrants as a Tipping Problem

In Part II, I explored the notion, posited by Professor Hale, that to
understand climate change, we need to view it as not only a tragedy of
the commons, but also as a tipping problem. As he notes, under the
standard tragedy of the commons analysis, we may assume that all
jurisdictions have similar, if not identical, motives. 344 However, just as
Id. at 1769.
Resolution Embracing Diversity and Clarifying the City’s Role in Enforcing Federal
Immigration Law: A Letter from Your Mayor, CITY SANTA MONICA (Mar. 1, 2017), https://beta.
smgov.net/strategic-goals/inclusive-diverse-community/diversity
[https://perma.cc/KXN4GNWQ].
340 Lasch et al., supra note 7, at 1769–70.
341 Id. at 1769.
342 Id.
343 Id. at 1769 & n.341 (citing Serin D. Houstin & Charlotte Morse, The Ordinary and
Extraordinary: Producing Migrant Inclusion and Exclusion in US Sanctuary Movements, 11
STUD. SOC. JUST. 27 (2017)).
344 Hale, supra note 111, at 15.
338
339
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he demonstrates that this is not true in the climate context, 345 it is also
clear from the sanctuary context that jurisdictions are motivated by a
variety of policy rationales concerning immigrants. Further, as in the
climate context, in the sanctuary context as well, it is clear that certain
jurisdictions have been the first and more aggressive movers in adopting
sanctuary policies.
Just as Hale explains that certain climate change mitigation steps
taken by particular jurisdictions may not be viewed as primarily climate
policy per se—but rather as co-benefits (such as reducing local pollution
or improving local health) 346—so too sanctuary jurisdictions adopt
policies based on a number of grounds. While some jurisdictions adopt
sanctuary policies to advance norms of inclusion, equality, and rule of
law, others enact these policies to defend local sovereignty, conserve
local resources, and/or avoid legal and monetary liability—rather than
to advance the rights of immigrants or address minority representation
per se. Those jurisdictions that frame sanctuary policies in these more
pragmatic terms (or in ways that combine pragmatism with what we
might think of as the civil rights case for immigrants) may be, in fact,
ultimately more successful in building alliances with law enforcement
and other unlikely bedfellows, which may assist in making these policies
more sustainable and more likely to be taken up by other jurisdictions,
particularly in red states. To the extent that various disentanglement
policies are adopted and even mimicked by other jurisdictions, the
norms that underlie these policies could slowly tip in this direction,
whether based on the pragmatic local sovereignty objective, effective
policing considerations, or the goal of addressing the minority
representation problem. The pending lawsuits involving California and
the Trump administration regarding sanctuary policy 347 have thus far
largely turned on separation of powers concerns.
See discussion supra Section II.C.
Hale, supra note 111, at 16.
347 For the lawsuits that California jurisdictions have filed against President Trump, see
supra note 98. The Trump administration has also sued California, challenging three laws that
comprise its sanctuary policies, claiming that the California laws “reflect a deliberate effort by
California to obstruct the United States’ enforcement of federal immigration law.” See Katie
Benner & Jennifer Medina, Trump Administration Sues California Over Immigration Laws,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/us/politics/justicedepartment-california-sanctuary-cities.html [https://perma.cc/2ADP-BU8G]. At the time of
345
346
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While the first wave of sanctuary policies (discussed supra)
involved religious leaders who sought to actively prevent federal
immigration officials from deporting Central American refugees who
faced persecution at home, “[t]oday’s sanctuary laws, while bearing the
same name, are markedly different.”348 Unlike the early wave, the
current wave of sanctuary policies is not actively interfering with federal
immigration enforcement. In fact, the exact opposite is true. Sanctuary
jurisdictions are stepping aside so that they will not be involved in
federal immigration policy at all. As Peter Markowitz notes:
[T]he defining characteristic of these laws is their passivity. They do
not direct state officers to take any steps to interfere with federal
enforcement efforts. Instead, they dictate that the local police and
state officers simply do not assist in the federal government’s
deportation agenda—that they do nothing. 349

Therefore, the federalism conflict between jurisdictions such as
California and the federal government is more akin to Printz v. United
States 350—where the federal government seeks to enlist states and
localities to do its bidding—than Arizona v. United States 351—where the
state government sought to regulate immigration in a way that was
preempted by federal immigration law. Asserting its interest in local
sovereignty and criminal justice, California’s attorney general, Xavier
this writing, the judge presiding over the case in the Eastern District of California has granted
in part and denied in part California’s motion to dismiss. United States v. California, No. 2:18cv-490-JAM-KJN, 2018 WL 3361055 (E.D. Cal. July 9, 2018).
348 Peter L. Markowitz, Opinion, Trump Can’t Stop the Sanctuary Movement, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/09/opinion/trump-california-sanctuarymovement.html [https://perma.cc/4BRK-R7X4].
349 Id.
350 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (Justice Scalia sustained a challenge to the federal Brady Act, which
required local sheriffs to conduct background checks for gun purchasers, in violation of the
anti-commandeering doctrine developed under the Tenth Amendment). Several scholars have
analyzed the current sanctuary policies as similar to Printz. See, e.g., Noah Feldman, Sanctuary
Cities Are Safe, Thanks to Conservatives, BLOOMBERG OPINION (Nov. 29, 2016, 2:52 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-11-29/sanctuary-cities-are-safe-thanks-toconservatives [https://perma.cc/9XYK-8CVQ]; Ilya Somin, More on Federalism, the
Constitution, and Sanctuary Cities, WASH. POST (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.washington
post.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/12/12/more-on-federalism-the-constitution-andsanctuary-cities/?utm_term=.31e2997b9a47 [https://perma.cc/L67G-9DJZ].
351 567 U.S. 387 (2012).
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Becerra, has noted, “California is in the business of public safety, not in
the business of deportations.” 352
Even while often framed in pragmatic terms, these policies have the
effect of responding to the intimidation, exclusion, and humiliation of
federal immigration policy. Furthermore, even though these sanctuary
jurisdictions do not have the power—nor are they necessarily seeking—
to provide legal citizenship to undocumented immigrants, these policies
often demonstrate the importance of factors beyond legal citizenship,
including broader norms of inclusion, equality, belonging, family
unification, respect, and dignity. 353
CONCLUSION: “NOT YOUR FATHER’S FEDERALISM” 354
As the climate and sanctuary policy case studies in this Article
suggest, certain federalism conflicts call for more serious attention to the
broader international context, not only because they are inherently
transnational, but also because these conflicts represent responses to the
types of problems John Hart Ely discussed as a basis for justifying
intervention when the political markets systematically malfunction. 355
While Ely’s theory was one of judicial review (horizontal separation of
powers), I have used his concept of political market failure as a basis for
a theory of federalism (vertical separation of powers).

Markowitz, supra note 348 (quoting Becerra).
Regarding the importance of “belonging” and these related values, see, for example,
Chacón, Conceptualizing Belonging, supra note 43; Jennifer Gordon & R.A. Lenhardt,
Rethinking Work and Citizenship, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1161 (2008); Amy C. Torres, Note, “I Am
Undocumented and a New Yorker”: Affirmative City Citizenship and New York City’s IDNYC
Program, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 335 (2017).
354 Professor Heather Gerken on “The Loyal Opposition: Why Our Federalism Is Not Your
Father’s Federalism”, YALE L. SCH. (Dec. 23, 2013), https://law.yale.edu/yls-today/yale-lawschool-videos/professor-heather-gerken-loyal-opposition-why-our-federalism-not-yourfathers-federalism [https://perma.cc/T39L-UTBD]. Similar to Gerken, I have invoked ways in
which governance today differs from governance paradigms of our fathers’ generation.
Catherine Powell, Gender Indicators as Global Governance: Not Your Father’s World Bank, 17
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 777 (2016), updated and reprinted in Catherine Powell, Gender Indicators
as Global Governance: Not Your Father’s World Bank, in BIG DATA, BIG CHALLENGES IN
EVIDENCE-BASED POLICYMAKING (H. Kumar Jayasuriya & Kathryn Ritcheske eds., 2015).
355 ELY, supra note 13, at 103.
352
353
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This Article examined two forms of political market failures to
explain—and support—the turn to lawmaking from below (and above,
where possible) the level of nation-state. The first type of political
market failure this Article discussed—in the immigration context—
results when minorities are not only underrepresented but also
systematically locked out of political power. 356 The second form of
political market failure I described—in the climate context—represents
the exact opposite problem: influential minorities—in this case, the
fossil fuel industry and other powerful economic interests—“dominate
the political process and the public has to be protected against legislative
capture” 357 or (as with climate policy) regulatory capture (within the
executive branch).
I have explored how federalism and international law can, at times,
be brought together to address political market failures. Climate policy
represents one type of failure, given that federal policy on climate
change has been subject to regulatory capture by the fossil fuel industry,
as a powerful economic minority. As a result, the Trump administration
has begun to roll back several critical elements of the U.S. federal
climate policy agenda, indicated its intention to withdraw from the 2015
Paris climate change agreement, and defunded climate change research,
thereby creating information asymmetries. This hollowing out of
climate regulation permits the fossil fuel industry to externalize the cost
of their environmentally-adverse behavior on the rest of the population.
Meanwhile, state and local leaders have told the Trump
administration to “get out of the way” and have directly engaged with
leaders from other countries as a way of ensuring the United States
meets its commitments under the Paris accord, even in the absence of
federal leadership. Under the Rio process, international environmental
regulation had been top-down, ineffective, and undermined by
collective action failures that were driven by regulatory capture. But the
Paris Agreement’s bottom up and polycentric architecture—which
builds in significant roles for subnational (and non-state) actors—is
helping to address these failures.
Understanding the problem of climate policy as not simply a
tragedy of the commons, but also as a tipping problem, adds greater
356
357

Id.
PETERSEN, supra note 14, at 19.
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clarity. This recognition highlights that state and local climate policy
innovation does not merely address a collective action problem based
on common interests (or disinterestedness) of similarly situated
jurisdictions, but can also incentivize first (and second, and third, etc.)
movers to act. By catalyzing greater action over time, state and local
adoption of climate change mitigation policies can diffuse regionally,
nationally, and even internationally by tipping over into other
jurisdictions and ideally paving the way for potential norm cascades.
Applying these insights to the context of sanctuary policies, part of
the problem is that unlike climate policy, international standards
governing immigrants are weak to nonexistent. Perhaps in part because
of this, state and local officials have not sought to engage or enlist
international norms.
At the same time, through disentangling their local law
enforcement from federal immigration enforcement, sanctuary
jurisdictions are poised to address the other type of market failure:
minority underrepresentation. Even when the motivations underlying
sanctuary policies are pragmatic, as opposed to rooted in social justice
concerns, these policies still have the effect of responding to the
intimidation, exclusion, and humiliation of federal immigration
policy—as such negative impacts in immigrant communities are
actually at odds with local law enforcement goals of building trust
through community policing and other efforts to secure cooperation
and safeguard public safety.
As the two case studies in this Article suggest, by offering checks
and balances, federalism is not only a fundamental cornerstone of our
constitutional design to prevent abuse and protect individual rights; it
can also address fundamental failures in our political process—whether
at the federal or sub-federal level. Where international standards are
available to help address these failures—particularly for issues that are
inherently transnational—federalism can also assist in advancing
international law, by facilitating the implementation of international
norms locally and by assisting in realizing these norms globally.
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